




THE CAMPAIGN 



OF 



CHANCELLOES VILLE 



BY 



DAVID GRKGG MCINTOSH 

Colonel of Artillery, C S. A. 




RICHMOND, VA. 

WM. ELLIS JONES' SONS, INC., PRINTERS 
I915 




THE CAMPAIG]^ 



OF 



OHA:^CELLORSyiLLE 



BY 

UAVID GREGO MCINTOSH 

Colonel of Ariillery, C. S. A. 



RICHMOND, VA. 

WM. ELLIS JONES' SONS, INC., PRINTERS 
I915 



E1475 

.35 

.Hl5 






THE CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 



By DAVID GREGG MclNTOSH 
Colonel of Artillery, C. S. A. 



The Chancellorsville campaign was altogether the most re- 
markable conducted by General Lee. While it occupied less than 
a week in point of time, it included a series of engagements, a 
number of which might be classed as battles. Some of these 
were fought independently by detached bodies, on fields widely 
separated, but all controlled and inspired by one master mind. 

Gettysburg was simply a square stand up fight ; a race, in 
the first place between, two hostile forces, each bent on concen- 
tration before the other; then a clash, ending with a magnificent 
assault which failed. And so it was at Fredericksburg, a face 
to face fight, the Confederates entrenched, and the Federals mak- 
ing the assaults, with disastrous results. Fredericksburg was 
largely an artillery battle and so was Gettysburg, but Chancellors- 
ville was distinctly a battle of small arms, fought in dense forests, 
where open spaces could rarely be found for artillery, and where 
it was impossible for infantry to preserve its alignment. Night 
attacks alternated with those by day, and were productive of 
panics and confusion. The odds appeared to be first on one 
side and then on the other, and again to be evenly balanced. 
The campaign presented on the whole a greater variety of situ- 
ations, and more spectacular features than any in which the army 
of Northern Virginia was ever engaged. 

The battle of Chancellorsville was probably the most diffi- 
cult of all General Lee's battles, at the same time it was his 
greatest success. At no time if we except the closing chapter 
of the war, did he have to face such overwhelming odds. After 
the battle of Fredericksburg he was reluctantly compelled to de- 
tach Longstreet and two of his best divisions, and send them 



south of Richmond, beyond his reach. Having to protect a 
front of ever twenty miles he only learned that Hooker was 
moving, and was crossing the Rapidan, when he was already 
upon his flank. At the same time, Sedgwick, with two army 
corps and a third in reserve, was crossing the Rappahannock in 
his front. If he moved to meet Hooker, Sedgwick had the road 
open to Richmond and could destroy his communications. 
Stoneman, with a cavalry force three times as large as Stuart, 
was already on the way to destroy the railroads in his rear. The 
situation was full of peril and might well appall the stoutest 
heart. That General Lee was able to meet it successfully proved 
him to be a master in the art of war, and made it his greatest 
triumph. In the midst of his first success, when Hooker had 
been routed at Chancellorsville and Lee was preparing to follow 
him, Sedgwick suddenly appeared in his rear, and he found 
himself between the two. It was a stroke of genius to hold 
Hooker at bay and turn upon Sedgwick, while Early in turn took 
Sedgwick in rear, and the positions of the combatants became 
reversed. This unique situation is believed to be without a pre- 
cedent, and is only approached by what occurred at Lodz in 
December, 1914, during the present war, where a Russian army 
was hemmed in between two German column,s and a fourth 
column, this time Russian, appeared upon the German flank. 

The unusual conditions which developed in this short cam- 
paign called for the exercise of all the best qualities which be- 
long to a Captain in war. They afforded, as no other battle- 
field did, the opportunity for the display of Lee's masterfulness 
in grappling with new and unexpected emergencies, while they 
exhibited at the same time his wonderful poise, and his fighting 
tenacity, and his heroic courage. It has been said that General 
Lee won through the mistakes of his enemy, but it is only the 
wise Captain who can see and profit by the mistakes of an 
enemy, and it might be added perhaps with more truth, that 
General Lee won in spite of the mistakes of those under him. 

While a great deal has been written about this battle, it is 
believed to be less generally understood than any battle of the 
Civil War. The official reports on both sides are full of incon- 



gruities. Official reports it may be said, as a rule, are unsatis- 
factory, and often fail to furnish the information which would 
prove most useful in fixing localities and estimating the effect 
of a given movement. It is a usual failing to exaggerate the 
effect of minor actions, and to minimize serious errors. It is 
only by comparisons of reports on both sides that an approxi- 
mate estimate can be arrived at. But any account of so intri- 
cate a battle as that of Chancellorsville, covering so wide an 
area, and involving so many changes of position, with few land 
marks to determine them, can only be general and must neces- 
sarily be imperfect. Individual prowess is hidden in the fog of 
battle, and organized units lose their identity. It is said that 
Victor Hugo spent three months studying the battlefield of 
Waterloo ; and the house is still shown which he occupied while 
writing up his account of that battle. But it may be doubted if 
with all this preparation, the brilliant author did not draw upon 
his imagination to supplement what he saw and what he heard. 

Notwitstanding the writer was in Jackson's flanking column 
and participated in the battle of May 3d, the movements of the 
two armies from April 30th to May 5th, and the relative location 
of the different battlefields were always shrouded in more or 
less obscurity. A visit to these fields a few years since enabled 
him to realize more fully the trying situations which General 
Lee had to meet, as well as the immense difficulties which Gen- 
eral Hooker overcame in his initial movement, and the oppor- 
tunities which he afterwards threw away. The interest thus 
stimulated led him to again go over many of the official reports 
and war maps, and to read more or less of the literature pub- 
lished on the subject, including Colonel Henderson's graphic ac- 
count, and the elaborate compilation of Captain Bigelow, and for 
his own satisfaction he has at leisure moments filled up the fol- 
lowing sketch. 

Before attempting however, any account of the campaign, 
it will be interesting to glance brieflly at the situation of the 
two armies, the obstacles to be overcome by either, in any of- 
fensive movement, and the considerations which were brought to 
bear upon the two commanding Generals. 



6 

When little more than a month after the disaster of Fred- 
ericksburg, Mr. Lincoln entrusted the command of the army to 
General Hooker, he was anxious that the advance should be re- 
sumed with the least possible delay. The hopes which he enter- 
tained from the time the Federal army was in sight of the 
capitol of the Confederacy in June, 1862, had been continually 
frustrated ; sentiment throughout the North was becoming ex- 
ceedingly impatient; the time of enlistment of a portion of the 
troops in service was about to expire ; desertions in the army 
were alarmingly frequent, and everything combined to make an 
early movement desirable. General Hooker was not a favorite 
of Halleck's, the Commander-in-Chief at Washington, but he 
was selected by Mr. Lincoln to head the army of the Potomac 
because of his energetic character and his fighting qualities. He 
had served creditably in the Mexican War, gone through the 
Peninsula campaign with McClellan as a division commander, 
and was in charge of one of the three grand divisions of the 
army under Burnside. Impetuous in disposition and outspoken 
by nature, he was wont to give expression to his opinion of his 
fellow officers including his superior in rank, and it was on this 
account that the very day preceding his appointment, General 
Burnside had prepared an order, subject to the approval of the 
President, dismissing him from the service. This, however, was 
diplomatically ignored by the two men when the transfer of the 
command was made: General Burnside in general orders, upon 
his taking leave asked the army, "to give to the brave and skill- 
ful General who has so long been identified with its organiza- 
tion, and who is now to command you, your full and cordial 
support, etc." While General Hooker in taking command says, 
he only "gives expression to the feeling of this army when he 
conveys to its late commanding General the most cordial good 
wishes for his future, etc." And adds, "in equipment, intelli- 
gence and valor, the enemy is our inferior, let us never hesitate 
to give him battle wherever we can find him." 

Mr. Lincoln in bestowing the appointment wrote : "What I 
now ask of you is militarv success * * * ; and now beware of 
rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless 
vigilance, go forward and gain us victories." 



The army of the Potomac had been much disheartened by 
the disastrous repulse met with in the previous December, and 
its discipline suffered in several respects ; among others, in the 
easy intercourse and familiarity which was established between 
the opposing pickets of the two armies. 

General Hooker set himself energetically at work to repair 
the morale of the army and to plan at once an offensive cam- 
paign. While his proneness to criticism did not commend him 
to all his fellow officers, the touch of a strong hand was in- 
stantly felt, and renewed confidence was inspired throughout the 
ranks. General Sickles bears testimony to the fact that when 
General Hooker rode with him along the lines on the morning of 
the eventful second of May, he was cheered to the echo, and re- 
ceived everywhere by the troops with the greatest enthusiasm. 

The improved discipline introduced by General Hooker, not 
only had an inspiring effect upon his own men, but it was soon 
manifested in curtailing the information which was in the habit 
of leaking through to the other side. Secretiveness became a 
prime characteristic of headquarters. Not even the staff were 
admitted to the full confidence of the General, and it is said 
that they, as well as the enemy, were often deceived as to the 
real character of projected movements. When General Hooker 
took command the army was disposed in the neighborhood of 
Falmouth on the Stafford Heights on the north side of the Rap- 
pahannock, and along the line of the railroad running to Aquia. 
On either side were infantry outposts, and beyond these a strong 
cordon of cavalry, and no communication was permitted outside 
these lines. 

On the i8th of February, three weeks after Hooker as- 
sumed command, General Lee wrote Mr. Davis, that General 
Hooker appeared to be abandoning his present position between 
the Rappahannock and the Potomac, and a large portion of his 
army to be descending the Potomac, but whether its destination 
was beyond Hampton Roads to Suffolk, or into North Carolina, 
he could not ascertain. Two days later he wrote, the enemy ap- 
peared still in his front in large numbers. While Lee was 
always of opinion that Hooker's effort would be to cross the 



8^ 

river above Fredericksburg, the reports that reached him were 
confused and contradictory. Accordingly, early in February he 
directed a reconnoitering party of Wickham's cavalry to cross 
the Rappahannock at the United States ford, descend the left 
bank, and find out the enemy's position. The river was at swim- 
ming point, and when the party had proceeded a few miles the 
enemy was discovered in force, compelling them to return empty 
handed. Subsequently General Fitz Lee was ordered with his 
brigade from Culpepper Court House to break through the out- 
posts and ascertain what lay behind. With his accustomed dash 
he penetrated the lines some miles beyond Hartwood Church, 
and after capturing a considerable number of prisoners, brought 
them off in the face of a large body of the enemy, and the Con- 
federate commander was assured of the fact of Hooker's pres- 
ence and how his army lay. 

General Hooker also set about reorganizing his army, and 
among other changes discarded the formation of the infantry 
into three grand divisions, retaining the corps formation as the 
unit. The reason assigned by him for the change, was that the 
grand division was cumbrous and unwieldy to handle. The army 
was thus made to consist of seven corps, each under its corps 
commander. Whether the change was judicious has given rise 
to a diversity of opinion. In the following spring, it may be 
said General Grant reduced the number of army corps, and the 
army was consolidated into three corps, making a corps about 
equal to the old grand division. 

General Hooker's first demonstration was against the Con- 
federate cavalry at Culpepper Court House, which General Aver- 
ill about the middle of March, with three thousand sabres, was 
directed to attack and disperse, by crossing the river at Kelly's 
ford. Averill was provided with four days' rations, but after a 
sharp fight with Fitz Lee half way between the river and Brandy 
Station he retired, to the great disgust and disappointment of 
Hooker. What should ultimately be the real line of attack was 
with General Hooker a matter of great solicitude. Burnside had 
already made an attack in front, nnd the result of that effort was 
not such as to invite a repetition. The passage of the river at 



some point below Fredericksburg with the aid of gunboats,, 
seizing Bowhng Green and the railroad, and throwing General 
Lee off his direct communications with Richmond was much con- 
sidered. Brigadier General Warren, chief topographical engi- 
neer, reported that to cross the river so as to gain the heights- 
below Lee's entrenchments, required the secret movement of 
pontoon trains and artillery for more than twenty miles over 
roads which were impassable, and that the first available point 
below Skinker's Neck would require one thousand feet of bridg- 
ing, which in his judgment made a movement by that flank im- 
practicable. The same authority looked upon a crossing im- 
mediately above Fredericksburg as scarcely more promising. He 
described the river as narrowing at Beck's Island two miles and 
a half above Fredericksburg, the bluffs a hundred and fifty feet 
in heighth on either side, "coming in close to the river, with 
steep wooded slopes cut by ravines, and difficult of approach." 

The first favorable conditions for approach which presented 
themselves to him were found at Banks' ford about six miles 
above by the road, though owing to a bend in the river only three 
miles from Fredericksburg on the south side. The river at the 
time of the report was not fordable, and he found it protected on^ 
the opposite side by several lines of intrenchments rising from 
the water's edge and constructed with traverses, as a protection 
against artillery fire. Being well guarded he considered its sur- 
prise impossible. The next point examined by Warren was the 
United States ford, seven miles above Banks' ford, where he re- 
ported finding long lines of infantry with battery epaulments, and 
an ample force in support and the river not fordable. 

Just above the LTnited States ford the river forks, the 
Northern branch retaining the name Rappahannock and the 
Southern branch being known as the Rapidan. The most con- 
siderable ford on the northern branch is called Kelly's, which is 
about four miles from Rappahannock Station, a point on the 
Orange & Alexandria Railroad, now called Remington. From 
Kelly's ford, roads ran westerly to Brandy Station and Cul- 
pepper, and southeasterly to Germanna and Ely's fords on the 
Rapidan, the latter passing through Richardsville direct to Chan- 
cellorsville, and the former intersecting the plank road from 



10 

■Orange Court House to Fredericksburg at the Wilderness Tav- 
ern, five miles west of Chancellorsville. After looking over all 
the ground, Warren, who was a most capable engineer, inclined to 
a move along the route just indicated, as least likely to attract 
attention. He thought, "that the passage of two streams, not 
fordable, and having a width of two to three hundred feet at 
such a long distance from our base by a flank movement with 
many pontoons and artillery trains, over roads almost impracti- 
cable, seemed so unlikely as to give the enemy no concern." 
Hooker took Warren's advice, and in a letter to Air. Lincoln 
of April nth, he communicated his purpose, adding "that he 
was apprehensive the enemy would retire the moment he should 
cross the river, and over the shortest line to Richmond, and thus 
■escape being seriously crippled, etc," 

Accordingly, he gave orders to Stoneman in command of 
the cavalry to begin the advance on the 13th of April, expecting 
to make feints of crossing the river at Fredericksburg and be- 
low, at the same time ; and as soon as Stoneman had fallen upon 
Lee's communications, he would make his real move by the 
right. But the extraordinary rains and consequent floods which 
prevailed for ten days rendered the first attempt abortive. Stone- 
man was unable to move, to Hooker's great chagrin. On the 21st 
he wrote to Mr. Lincoln, "the weather appears to continue averse 
to the execution of my plans as first formed, but if these do not 
admit of speedy solution I "feel that I must modify them to 
conform to the condition of things as they are. I was attached 
to the movement as first projected, as it promised unusual suc- 
cess, but if it fails I will project a movement which I trust will 
secure us success but not to so great an extent, and one, on 
the execution of which I shall be able to give personal super- 
vision." What was meant by the latter expression has never 
iDeen explained. In the movement which began a week later 
when the weather had cleared, the plan as originally designated 
was pursued, and it does not appear that so much of it as con- 
templated the interruption of General Lee's communications was 
departed from by him, or by his chief of cavalry. But before 
following the movement let us observe the situation on the other 
•side. 



11 

After the battle of Fredericksburg the proximity of his op- 
ponent required General Lee to maintain a defensive line about 
twenty-five miles in length. His army consisted of two corps, < 
the first commanded by Longstreet, and the second by Jackson, \ 
each corps consisting of four divisions. Longstreet's corps oc- 
cupied the range of hills back of Fredericksburg, extending from 
the river to what was known as Hamilton's Crossing, a station 
on the railroad about six miles from Fredericksburg, where the 
range of hills is broken. It also held Banks' and the United 
States' fords. Above the latter the crossings were watched by 
cavalry. Jackson's corps occupied a position extending down 
the river from Hamilton's crossing to Port Royal. His head- 
quarters were at the Corbin House, Moss Neck ; and when spring 
approached at the Yerby House in rear of Hamilton's crossing. 
General Lee's headquarters were about three miles south of 
Fredericksburg. The only material change in the organization 
of Lee's army was in the artillery, which was reorganized into 
battalions, consisting usually of four batteries each. Separate 
batteries were no longer attached to infantry brigades, but the 
battalion under field officers was attached to infantry divisions. 
The cavalry of the army commanded by Stuart, consisted of 
two small brigades, one under Fitz Lee at Culpepper Court 
House, where were Stuart's headquarters, and the other under 
W. H. F. Lee ; Hampton having been sent to the rear to recruit 
his brigade. 

In the latter part of January Pickett's division of Long- 
street's corps was withdrawn from the front and moved to Salem 
Church, a point on the plank road about four miles from Fred- 
ericksburg, afterwards the scene of a fierce battle, and some in- 
trenchments were thrown up designed to form a rallying pouit 
in case the troops on the river front should be compelled to 
abandon that line. 

When the news reached Richmond that Burnside's corps had 
embarked for Fortress Monroe, it excited much apprehension, 
as being the forerunner of a movement against that place from 
the south side of James River. The apprehension was increased 
by reports of other similar movements, and it led finally to the 



12 

detachment of two divisions. Hood's and Pickett's under Long- 
street, to guard Richmond against an attack from that quarter. 
It does not appear from the official correspondence on the Fed- 
eral side that any serious movement of that sort was in fact 
contemplated, but General Longstreet as well as the authorities 
in Richmond were obsessed with that idea. 

It is evident from the correspondence of the period that 
General Lee parted with his two divisions with reluctance. On 
the 1 6th of February he wrote the President that he had received 
the dispatch of the Secretary of War, conveying his, the Presi- 
dent's wishes, and that he had accordingly directed Hood to 
march to Hanover Junction, and that Longstreet was directed 
tc- move Pickett on to Richmond. The letter indicates that Lee 
was meditating an ofifensive himself as soon as conditions be- 
came favorable. 

On the 1 6th of March General Lee wrote Longstreet, refer- 
ring to the removal of Burnside's corps and its expected ap- 
pearance south of James River; that from present appearances 
it was fair to presume he would be called on to engage the 
enemy first on the Rappahannock, and he wished him to be pre- 
pared to return the troops recently detached to that point when 
it became necessary. On the 17th, Longstreet replied, "I shall 
be ready to join you with Hood's division at any moment, and 
trust to your being able to hold the force in your front in check 
until I can join you." On the 19th, Longstreet wrote, "It seems 
to me a matter of prime necessity to keep the enemy out of 
North Carolina in order that we may draw all the supplies there, 
and if we give him ground at all, it would be better to do so 
from the Rappahannock. It is right as you say, to concentrate 
and crush him ; but will it be better to concentrate on his grand 
army, than on his detachments, and then make a grand concen- 
tration on the grand army? If we draw oflf from the front of 
his grand army, we ought to be able to crush rapidly his detach- 
ments, and at the same time hold the grand army in check as 
far as South Anna at least, particularly while the roads are so 
very bad, then concentrate on the grand army and dispose of 
that." In pursuance of this idea he applied to Lee for another 



13 

division of his corps, to which Lee replied, "If this army is fur- 
tlier weakened, we must retire to the Hne of the Annas', and 
trust to a battle near Richmond for the defence of the capitol. 
* * * Unless therefore, a retrograde movement becomes neces- 
sary, I deem it advantageous to keep the enemy at a distance, 
and trust to striking him on his line of advance." 

On April 27th General Lee writing Mr. Davis and thanking 
him for the steps taken to reinforce the cavalry and increase the 
army supplies, says, that he had written General Longstreet to 
expedite his operations in North Carolina, as he might be ob- 
liged to call him back at any moment. 

On the 29th Mr. Davis addressing the Secretary of War 
and transmitting a dispatch from General Lee says, "The de- 
mand which was looked for has come and requires prompt at- 
tention. This (alluding to Lee's dispatch) of course involves 
rapid and immediate movement of troops and supplies, to enable 
General Lee to meet the enemy and sustain himself in whatever 
position it may be necessary to assume." When Longstreet was • 
ordered to move he delayed doing so, on the ground that to 
move at once would lose the supplies and the transportation he 
had gathered. When the battle of Chancellorsville came ofif he 
was still south of Richmond. 

One is tempted to ask why General Lee did not use more 
•energetic measures in dealing with the administration, and with 
his subordinates. But General Lee was always the opposite of 
being aggressive in his attitude to the Government, and forbear- 
ing to those under him. For Mr. Davis, personally, he enter- 
tained the most profound respect, and their relations were always 
most cordial. To him as the nominal Commander-in-Chief he 
seems to have always accorded a gracious deference. In the 
matter of army supplies, he stated his wants to the heads of de- 
partments in plain terms, but there was not sufficient energy in 
the departments to make these wishes effective. Had he been a 
Napoleon instead of a Lee, the Star of Destiny for the South 
may have changed its course. But as he was fighting for Con- 
stitutional liberty, the subordination of the military to civic au- 
thority was with him supreme. 



14 

In the game of War which now went on between the op- 
posing leaders^ General Hooker was confused by contradictory 
reports as to the strength of Lee's army, and the size of the de- 
tachments which left it. On the other hand various reports 
came to Lee as to Hooker's designs, and these were sometimes 
supported by feints which had the appearance of being serious 
moves. On the 226. of April a second demonstration was made 
by Hooker below Fredericksburg, and a crossing effected from 
Port Conway in canvas boats, but after the capture of a wagon 
train and a few prisoners, the expedition came to an end amidst 
a deluge of rain. While the feints on the lower Rappahannock 
did not deceive General Lee, it appears that the movement pro- 
jected by the cavalry under Stoneman did, for he wrote to 
Stuart on the 25 th of April of his apprehensions that Stoneman 
would cross the Blue Ridge, in which event he, Stuart, was to 
plunge into the rear of the Federal army and cut their line of 
communication. 

On the 25th of April after it had rained for ten days, the 
skies cleared, the mud began to dry, and the hour for Hooker's 
advance arrived. Orders were issued on the 26th, which di- 
rected with great precision how the respective movements should 
be made. The nth and 12th corps under Howard and Slocum 
were directed to march from their encampments in the order 
named, at sunrise on the 27th, and to reach Kelly's ford by 4 
P. M. on the 28th, without discovering themselves to the enemy. 
Meade's corps by a different route was to reach the same vi- 
cinity at the same hour. Two divisions of the 2d corps under 
Couch were also to move to Bank's ford, excepting a brigade 
and battery which was to take position at the United States ford ; 
the remainder being held in reserve. The troops were provided 
with eight days' rations, five of which were to be carried in the 
men's haversacks, and three in their knapsacks, a supply of beef 
for five days to be taken along on the hoof. In addition each man 
was to carry sixty rounds of ammunition, and eighty more were 
to be carried chiefly on pack mules. While this arrangement 
added to the mobility of the army, it may be doubted whether 
that advantage was not over-balanced by the fatigue endured by 



15 

the men carrying a load estimated to weigh between forty-five 
and sixty pounds. 

As soon as this movement was weU under way, Sedgwick 
was directed to have the ist and 6th corps in position to cross 
the river below Fredericksburg at 3 130 A. AI. on the 29th. When 
the crossing was completed, Sedgwick was expected to secure 
the Telegraph road as the direct route to Richmond, and also the 
River road which ran for some miles parallel to the river, and 
turning south at Hamilton's Crossing led to Bowling Green. The 
3rd corps under Sickles, after making a demonstration with 
Sedg'vvick, was to join the right wing under Hooker. Gibbon 
with a division was to remain at Falmouth. The cavalry under 
Stoneman in two columns with 7,600 sabres and 12 guns was 
directed to cross the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford, and pro- 
ceeding, one column towards Gordonsville, and the other in the 
direction of Hanover Junction, to unite after destroying the 
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad, and intercept 
the retreat of Lee's army. Pleasanton's division was to remam 
and move with the army. The plan was well conceived. As 
soon as Bank's ford was open the two wings of the army would 
be drawn near together, and Butterfield as Chief of Staff at 
Falmouth, with telegraphic communication, was to transmit or- 
ders quickly betv/een the two wings. 

Carrying out the program, at 3 A. M. on the 29th, Devin's 
cavalry brigade crossed in the vicinity of Kelly's ford and made 
straight for Germanna and Ely's fords on the Rapidan, cover- 
ing the right and left flanks of the infantry. The Confederate 
pickets at Kelly's ford were captured during the evening of the 
28th, and at 10 P. M. canvas boats having arrived from Wash- 
ington, the troops began crossing. Stuart, who was at Culpep- 
per Court House, was at once apprised, but he was in ignorance 
of the extent of the movement, and sent forward a regiment of 
W. H. F. Lee's brigade from Brandy Station for observation. 
Early during the day of the 29th, he telegraphed General 
Lee that Howard had crossed at Kelly's ford with a division of 
about 14,000 men, six pieces of artillery, and some cavalry. The 
crossing of the three corps meantime proceeded steadily and 



16 

was completed shortly after noon. The nth and 12th corps 
took the road to Germanna ford, and the 5th corps that to Ely's 
ford. Germanna ford on the Rapidan is distant from Kelly's 
on the Rappahannock about nine miles, and jxam. Ely's is distant 
about fourteen miles. The only opposition encountered by the 
Federal troops was from the 15th Virginia cavalry on the way to 
Germanna ford. At that point a small Confederate force was en- 
gaged in the construction of a bridge over the river to facilitate 
communication between Stuart at Culpepper and the army. This 
detachment and the picket on outpost were cleverly captured, 
only a handful escaping to Wilderness Tavern. Stuart says in 
his report that the couriers sent by him to Ely's and Germanna 
fords to notify the forces there of the enemy's advance were 
captured and hence the surprise, but it seems the Federals were 
already in possession at Germanna before the couriers were dis- 
patched. It was not until the afternoon that learning from his 
pickets of the large force about Madden, he assembled his two 
brigades and pierced the column, taking prisoners from the dif- 
ferent Federal corps. The river at Germanna ford was between 
three and four feet in depth. The foremost of the troops to 
arrive waded across, hanging their cartridge boxes and haver- 
sacks on their fixed bayonets, but the bridge which was soon re- 
built furnished passage for the bulk of the two .corps. The 
leading corps, the 12th, completed its passage by 11 P. M., and 
before midnight the nth was well under way. After crossing 
the two corps went into camp on the south side of the river. 

At Ely's ford the river was equally deep and running with 
a swift current. General Meade is said to have hesitated and 
sent to Slocum for instructions, and the latter replied, his men 
were fording through swift water breast deep, and that the 5th 
•corps must cross without further delay. No serious opposition 
was encountered, and this corps also went into bivouac for the 
night on the south side. 

General Meade's first object was to clear the ground in his 
front, and open communication with General Couch on the north 
side of the river, who with the 2d corps had been directed to 
march to the United States ford. The squadrons of cavalry sent 



17 

out by him surrounded and captured in the early morning a Con- 
federate outpost, and proceeded, one in the direction of Chan- 
cellorsville, the other towards the United States ford. The for- 
mer met Httle resistance, but the latter reported that after driving 
the enemy several miles, they were found drawn up in line of 
battle, which caused General Meade to direct a division under 
Sykes to proceed to United States ford. Pausing on Hunting 
Run to learn the effect of Sykes' move, he received word from 
Devin that the road to Chancellorsville was open, and he re- 
sumed the march, reaching Chancellorsville at ii A. M., April 
30th, distant from Fredericksburg ten miles. 

Chancellorsville appears to have been the Mecca of the 
Union army. It was undoubtedly so regarded by General Hooker. 
We made it our Mecca, when the writer with some friends on a 
certain day in the last of August, 191 1, drew rein before the only 
house in sight, and asked permission to water our horses, and 
eat our luncheon under the shade in the yard. The house, which 
is of brick, must have been a pretentious one in its day for that 
locality. 

We did not enter, as the ladies who came to the door re- 
ported members of the family sick with a low fever, but the 
building which had been injured by fire is now restored, and 
presents the same appearance as it did in 1863. We took our 
luncheon on the steps of the porch, just by the tall pillar against 
which General Hooker was leaning on the 3d of May when the 
pillar was struck by a shot and the General injured by the con- 
cussion; and as we drank the steaming hot tea prepared for us 
by the fair equestrienne of the party, we faced the plain and 
battlefield of Chancellorsville. The open plain in front just 
across the road looking south appears smaller than it did in 
1863, and is more overgrown with bushes, but on all sides is 
fringed by the same woods. Far off to the South and beyond 
the range of vision is Wellford's or Catherine Furnace. A lit- 
tle to the west but not so far, although obscured by trees, is Hazel 
Grove, while around to the right and a short distance south of 
the road is Fairview where there was an old burying ground. 
The road immediately in our front is the old turnpike, but usually 



18 

^ at this point called the Plank road. A hundred and fifty yards 
to the east of us and where the forest begins, the road forks, 
the turnpike keeping the straight course, and the Plank road 
bending to the south, the two coming together again at Taber- 
nacle Church, about four and a half miles distant. Where they 
first diverge they are intersected by the road from Ely's ford on 
which the old corduroys' laid by the army are still to be seen. A 
half mile back of us the Ely's ford road is intersected at Chand- 
ler's house by a road called the Mineral Spring road running 
northerly to the River road at a point below the United States 
ford. From Chandler's house a woods road also communicates 
with the Plank road west of Chancellor's house. These roads 
give Chancellorsville a strategic importance which otherwise it 
would not possess. Going west the Plank road diverges again to 
the south from the turnpike at Dowdall's Tavern about two miles 
distant, following the line of the watershed between the Rapidan 
and the Mattapony. On the north side of the turnpike beyond 
Dowdall's is a little chapel called Wilderness Church, and some 
miles beyond that is the Wilderness Tavern. The road from 
Germanna ford crosses the turnpike and runs to the Plank road, 
the two being a mile and a half apart at that point. Beyond the 
Germanna road running southerly from the turnpike to Todd's 
tavern is a well known road called the Brock road. Most in- 
teresting by far however, of all these localities is the sequestered 
spot about three-quarters of a mile westerly just beyond the ra- 
vine in front of Fairview, and a little to the north side of the 
road, where a modest pedestal and block of stone mark the spot 
■ where Jackson fell. Illustrious shade ! No one can approach 
the spot without being awed by the consciousness that here the 
very genius of war fell a merciless victim to fate, and that the 
very passion which made him glorious and great proved his own 
destruction. All nature seems to stand by in mute reverence. 
Not a sound escapes through all the wide forest. Not the note 
of a bird, or the whisper of an insect; the very atmosphere it- 
self seems laden with its heaviness, and the silence of death is 
all pervading. 

When General Mahone learned that his outposts at Ger- 



19 

manna ford had been captured, and that those escaping were " 
collected at Wilderness Tavern, he directed the latter to report to 
Chancellorsville, at which point Anderson was assembling his 
division. At 6 A. M., a few hours before the arrival of Meade, 
Anderson under orders retired two brigades, Wright's and 
Posey's by the Plank road, and Mahone by the turnpike, to the 
vicinity of Zion Church, where a defensive position was selected 
and the work of entrenching begun. Mahone's brigade was es- 
tablished north of the turnpike, Posey's between the turnpike and 
the Plank road, and Wright's between the Plank road and an 
unfinished railroad to the south. During this operation the Fed- 
eral cavalry made a bold attack upon Mahone's rear guard upon 
reaching some open ground, but met with a decided repulse by 
the 1 2th Virginia infantry. 

From Germanna ford Slocum with his two corps resumed 
the march on the morning of the 30th between 6 and 7 A. M. 
Colonel Owen with two squadrons of cavalry was directed by 
Fitz Lee at 3 A. M. to move forward from Locust Grove on the 
turnpike, get in front of and delay the enemy as far as possible, 
and report his information to General Lee. He moved to Wil- 
derness Tavern and sent a scouting party towards Germanna and 
Ely's fords. Some of these bearing information back to Fitz 
Lee were captured, and some reported that they were unable to 
communicate with the Confederate infantry who were falling 
back, and the Federals were already at Chancellorsville. Owen 
moved first towards Chancellorsville, and finding a strong force 
in his front turned south towards Todd's tavern. The courier v 
sent by him with dispatches to General Lee, escaping the Fed- 
eral cavalry at Chancellorsville, and making a detour to the 
south, reached General Lee about noon, which was the first in- 
telligence he had that day from the Rapidan. 

Upon the appearance of Slocum in the vicinity of Wilder- 
ness tavern, the Federal cavalry covering the right of his lead- 
ing division had a sharp brush with Stuart's cavalry, commanded 
by him in person, which required the support of Federal in- 
fantry: thereupon Stuart retired intending to swing around by 
Spottsylvania Court House and join General Lee. Slocum con- 



20 

tinued his march without further interruption, crossing the turn- 
pike to the Plank road, and moving on that road easterly to the 
vinicity of Chancellorsville, the head of the 12th corps reaching 
that place about 2 P. M., while Howard, with the nth corps, 
halted at Dowdall's tavern. 

Hooker now had three army corps assembled at Chancellors- 
ville, and another under Couch approaching by the United States 
ford road, while Sickles was ready to move and join him at a 
moment's notice. His plans had worked out well. His leading 
corps had marched near forty miles and occupied the coveted 
ground with scarcely a show of resistance. He was greatly 
elated, and had good reason to be proud of his success. When 
one considers how well the movement was guarded, the difficult 
character of the roads, and the passage of the two fords over 
the Rapidan, with the long tortuous hills on the southern side 
and the sticky red clay characteristic of Orange County, it must 
be admitted to have been a remarkable feat, and merited the ver- 
dict generally given at the time, that it was a brilliant success, 
and that he had clearly outmanouvered Lee. Having succeeded 
thus far Hooker believed he commanded the situation. It ad- 
mitted of great possibilities, but if he saw them, he was not dis- 
posed to depart from his original program. He was now on the 
ground which Grant had to fight for in the succeeding year, with 
the diiTerence that then Grant was east of Lee, and now Hooker 
was west of Lee. From Chancellorsville to Spottsylvania Court 
House is less than eight miles in an air line, with connecting 
roads either by Todd's tavern or by Aldrich and Piney Branch 
Church. From the Plank road wdiere Slocum struck it to Todd's 
tavern over the Brock road is a little over four miles, and about 
the same distance from Todd's tavern to Spottsylvania Court 
House, which is a little east of south from Chancellorsville. As 
General Lee was in ignorance of how Hooker had disposed his 
forces, and so late as the afternoon of the ist inquired of 
Stuart where the nth and 12th corps were, stating that the 
prisoners taken were from Meade's corps only, it is difficult to 
see any good reason why Hooker should not have continued his 
movement and made Spottsylvania his objective instead of Chan- 



21 

cellorsville. He would then have been out of the wilderness in 
the open country, and directly upon General Lee's communica- 
tions, and the latter been between Sedgwick and Hooker. Gen- 
eral Hooker however, was persuaded that the position of Chan- 
cellorsville commanded the situation, and from his headquarters 
at Falmouth at 2:15 P. M., he issued an order that no advance 
should be made from Chancellorsville until the 2d, 3d, 5th, nth 
and 1 2th corps were all concentrated at that place. General 
Hooker said afterwards to the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War, "I knew I could not cross the river in the presence of 
Lee's army, if he was informed of my movement. The great 
difficulty I apprehended was in crossing the river. I appre- 
hended no serious trouble after I had crossed." 

Had Hooker accompanied his leading column, or arrived at 
Chancellorsville at the same time, he might have felt the enthusi- 
asm of General Meade, when the latter is said to have exclaimed 
to Slocum, "Hurrah for old Joe; we are on Lee's flank, and he 
doesn't know it. You take the Plank road towards Fredericks- 
burg, and I take the pike, or vice versa, and we will get out of 
this wilderness." Hooker was at Falmouth and joined the army 
during the afternoon. In general orders he announced to the 
army, his heartfelt satisfaction over the operations of the last 
three days, which he said "had determined that our enemy must 
either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his entrench- 
ments and give us battle on our own ground where certain de- 
struction awaits him." 

Two divisions of Couch's corps arrived during the night 
crossing at United States ford, and Sickles with his corps by 
9. A. M. next morning. 

The seven corps of General Hooker's army at this time ac- 
cording to the official reports embraced 133,868 officers and men 
as its effective strength present for duty. Deducting the pro- 
vost guard, artillery reserve and absent cavalry under Stoneman, 
there was left about 122,000. Sedgwick had his own corps and 
Reynold's amounting to 40.575, and Gibbon's division estimated 
at 5,500 would give Sedgwick 46,000 men, and Hooker 76,000. 

Let us now see what preparation General Lee was making. 



22 

and whether he would ingloriously fly, or come out from behind 
his entrenchments and give battle. General Hooker thought he 
had him clearly beaten, and it appeared he had won the first point 
in the game. On the morning of the 29th General Lee received a mes- 
sage from General Jackson, through his Aide de Camp, Captain 
James Power Smith, that the enemy under cover of a heavy 
fog were discovered crossing the river below Deep Run. In 
communicating the fact to the authorities at Richmond, he said 
the force was large and appeared to be in earnest, and he wished 
all troops not required south of James River to be sent in his 
direction. Later in the morning, he heard through Stuart of the 
passage of the Rappahannock by Howard's corps at Kelly's ford. 
As if he were apprehensive of a move towards Gordonsville, he 
recommended Longstreet's division to be sent to him, and any 
other available troops to that point. Jackson's corps was at once 
moved to the left to occupy the space between the Massaponax 
River and Deep Run, connecting there with Anderson's division. 
General Jackson proposed to Lee to attack Sedgwick, and Gen- 
eral Lee seems to have given his consent, provided Jackson 
thought he could do so successfully. The project however was 
abandoned. When it is remembered that the heavy guns on 
Stafford's Heights swept all the river plain back to the hills on 
the south side, of which Jackson had experience on the 13th of 
December, 1862, and that the same thing was then discussed, but 
given up, it is not likely the plan was very seriously considered. 

Late in the afternoon of the 29th, Lee received through 
couriers the information that the Federal army was crossing the 
Rapidan at Germanna and Ely's fords. The Federal columns 
had apparently interrupted communication with Stuart, and Gen- 
eral Lee up to this time was in doubt whether Howard's corps 
which he last heard from at Kelly's ford was not headed for 
Gordonsville. 

Stuart after skirmishing with the Federal advance had re- 
tired to Todd's tavern, where his cavalry rested. He was pro- 
ceeding with a small escort to communicate with General Lee 
by a road running in the direction of Spottsylvania Court House, 
when he fell in with the Sixth New York cavalry, which had 



23 

advanced from Chancelloisville to that point, and a sharp skir- 
mish ensued, in which Stuart was compelled to call up some of 
his reserve, and in which Colonel McVickar, of the Sixth New 
York, fell mortally wounded. 

The situation was becoming tense. If the enemy desired 
battle, General Lee was ready to give it : but if they were mov- 
ing on his communications it would then seem there was nothing 
to do but to retire. There was much discussion among Con- 
federate officers as to Hooker's intentions. General Lee was 
convinced however, that Hooker would never uncover Washing- 
ton, and no matter what his inclinations might be, if he were 
left to indulge them, he was not at liberty to hazard such a stake. 
He wisely divined therefore that Hooker's objective must be 
Chancellorsville, and he prepared to meet him on that ground. 

Anderson's three brigades were now facing three full Fed- 
eral army corps. To meet the situation, General Lee directed 
McLaws to leave a brigade of his division to hold the lines im- 
mediately in rear of Fredericksburg, and to move with his re- 
maining three brigades to reinforce Anderson. General Jack- 
son was directed to leave a division of his corps to hold the lines 
in Sedgwick's front, and with the remainder of the corps to join 
Anderson at Tabernacle Church and take command of all the 
forces at that point. 

One of the cavalry brigades under Fitz Lee was directed to 
keep in touch with Hooker's army and supply information ; the 
other under Stuart was to keep in touch with Lee's army, and 
cover its movements. Longstreet at the same time, was ordered 
to move to Richmond to effect a junction with Lee. 

Having concenerated his five corps. Hooker on the morn- 
ing of May 1st ordered an advance; Meade with two divisions 
Griffin's and Humphrey's on the river road, Sykes on the turn- 
pike, and Slocum on the Plank road. It does not appear from 
the wording of the order whether it was intended as an attack 
upon any force it might encounter, or whether it was to take up 
a new defensive position. 

At the same time he directed Sedgwick to advance in full 
force at one o'clock and threaten an attack, "making the demon- 



24 

stration as serious as can be without an actual attack." This 
indicated that Hooker was not aware of Lee's having already 
transferred the bulk of his army from Fredericksburg to the 
neighborhood of Chancellorsville. The demonstration was in- 
tended to prevent that very thing. As Hooker had surprised 
Lee by his concentration at Chancellorsville, so Lee now sur- 
prised Hooker by his concentration at Zion and Tabernacle 
Churches. 

When Jackson ahead of his troops reached Tabernacle 
Church he ordered the intrenching to stop, and to prepare to 
advance. He was a thorough believer in the military principle 
which reckons the advantage on the side of the attacking party. 
As soon as the troops could be formed the movement began in 
two columns, McLaws with four brigades on the turnpike, fol- 
lowed by Wilcox with his brigade from Banks' ford, and Perry 
with his brigade from opposite Falmouth. On the Plank road, 
Rodes' and Hill's divisions, with the brigades of Wright and 
Posey, were led by Jackson in person. McLaws' skirmishers 
ran almost immediately into the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry, which 
v/as thrown back upon the head of Sykes' division, which in turn 
drove back the Confederate skirmishers, and advanced to a ridge 
with open ground in front, about two miles and a half from 
Chancellorsville, and about one mile from Zion Church. Sykes 
deployed his division across the turnpike at right angles to it, 
holding one brigade in reserve. McLaws deploying with greater 
front, overlapped Sykes on both flanks, and sent word to Jackson 
suggesting an attack on Sykes' right from the Plank road. Jack- 
son directed him to hold his position. Meantime a sharp en- 
gagement ensued. Sykes had advanced more rapidly along the 
pike than had Meade upon his left or Slocum upon his right, and 
failing to get in touch with either he reported the situation to 
Hooker, when the latter sent him word to retire, sending also 
Couch with a division and some artillery to his support. Sykes 
however began retiring before the order reached him. Couch it 
seems was reluctant to abandon the movement, and delayed the 
execution of the order until he could report that he thought the 
advanced position a good one and should be held, but the pe- 



25 

remptory order was then given to retire. Later in the afternoon 
Hooker sent word to Couch to hold the position until five o'clock, 
extend his skirmishers on either flank, and that Slocum would 
hold a position on the Plank road equally advanced, but Couch 
replied the order was too late as he was then in full retreat. 
During the afternoon AIcLaws was directed by Jackson to press 
on up the turnpike towards Chancellorsville. He with three 
brigades of Hill's division, moving across from the Plank road 
struck the turnpike half a mile in advance of McLaws and en- 
gaged Hancock who was covering Sykes' retirement, and pressed 
him back to within a short distance of Chancellorsville. 

Couch was undoubtedly right in thinking the position gained 
by Sykes was a good one and should be held. Sykes had ad- 
vanced about two miles and a half from Chancellorsville leaving 
the worst of the wilderness behind him, and reached a very con- 
siderable clearing extending across the pike in the direction of 
the river, with open ground mostly high, and admirably suited 
for the use of artillery and the deployment of large bodies of 
troops. But as so often happens. Hooker was not impressed 
with the value of time. His troops did not get under way until 
between ten and eleven o'clock, when Sykes might just as easily 
have occupied the ground three or four hours earlier, and had 
time to select his position, and throw out feelers for Humphreys 
and Griffin on his left, and Slocum on his right. Couch did not 
hesitate to express his indignation at being required to surren- 
der the advantages of the advanced position and fight a defensive 
battle, in a "nest of thickets." 

On the Confederate side Anderson, who was reinforced by 
Ramseur's brigade, succeeded in forcing back Slocum's line to a 
point beyond Aldrich's house, where an opportunity was pre- 
sented for the use of artillery, and a brisk duel ensued between 
the opposing artillery. While this was in progress Slocum re- 
ceived orders to retire. On the retreat Slocum was vigorously 
pressed by Rodes' division and Posey's brigade, and his column 
was thrown into some disorder, but finally regained its original 
•position without serious loss. Posey's advance was retarded by 
the Great Meadow Swamp forming the head of Mott's Run, but 



26 

after passing through the swampy he pressed forward until he 
was met by a number of Slocum's guns placed in position at the 
junction of the Plank road and the turnpike, just east of Chan- 
cellor's house, and disposed so as to command both approaches. 
The balance of Slocum's guns were placed on the heights of 
Fairview west of Chancellorsville and facing south. 

Wright's brigade leaving the Plank road and bearing to the 
left, was directed to get upon the enemy's right fiank and rear. 
Wright followed the line of an unfinished railroad, to the Fur- 
nace road, and the latter to the Furnace, which he reached at 
half past four P. M. Here he found Stuart who informed him 
the Federals occupied the woods to the north of the Furnace. 
Wright deployed two of his regiments and advanced through the 
forest until he came in contact with a portion of Williams' divi- 
sion, which he forced back to the farm house. Stuart sent to 
his support a section of horse artillery, but these drawing fire 
from a greater number at Fairview and at Hazel Grove, and 
night coming on, he withdrew. During the night Fitz Lee who 
with his brigade was a mile and a half further west on the Brock 
road, had a slight engagement with an infantry regiment sent 
out from Howard's corps a mile distant on the turnpike. 

The 5th corps which moved on the river road reached a 
point within sight of Banks' ford when it received orders to turn 
back, which were executed without question or delay. Sedg- 
wick's order to advance at one, was not received by him until 
after 4 P. M. He began a demonstration at six. Hooker in the 
meantime sending an order to countermand it. 

Thus ended the operations of May ist, with Hooker occupy- 
ing the lines he held the night before. The prestige of his first 
success was gone. Up to the moment of his arrival at Chancel- 
lorsville, his movements were characterized by the greatest en- 
ergy and dispatch, but from that time there was a manifest lack 
of character and decision. Whether his failure to follow up the 
movement which was so auspiciously begun, was owing to chag- 
rin and disappointment in not hearing as he seems to have ex- 
pected from Sedgwick, or whether his resolution became "sick- 
lied o'er" by the memory of Mr. Lincoln's admonition against 



27 

rashness, it would be hard to say. But his attitude of mind was 
quickly betrayed to the staff and corps commanders. At 2 P. M. 
he sent Butterfield the following telegram, "From character of 
information, have suspended attack. The enemy may attack me. 
- * * I will try it. Tell Sedgwick to keep a sharp lookout and 
attack if he can succeed." The most charitable construction 
to put on the message is, that Hooker was staggered by the un- 
expected resistance he encountered, and that he lost his nerve. 
When he testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War he said, "As soon as Couch's division and Sickles' corps 
came up, I directed an advance for the purpose in the first in- 
stance, of drawing the enemy away from Bank's ford, which was 
six miles down the river, in order that we might be in closer 
communication with the left wing of the army." When asked by 
the Committee what action was taken on the first day, he re- 
plied, "I went out to attack the enemy." There is no doubt that 
General Hooker had firmly persuaded himself that there was 
but one thing left for Lee to do, and that was to get away. 
When he succeeded in getting Lee out of his entrenchments, he 
did not believe it possible that the latter would turn and fight. 
When he discovered upon ordering an advance that Lee was in 
heavy force in his front, and assuming the offensive, it com- 
pletely upset him, and broke up all his calculations. It was in 
this frame of mind, that he "suspended the attack." He was 
still confident however, that Lee would not fight, as shown by the 
events of the subsequent day. He clung to the belief that his 
success in turning Lee's flank, left him no alternative but to re- 
tire, wdiich would be impossible by reason of Stoneman's raid 
in his rear. He concluded therefore to "sit tight," and act on 
the defensive. At 4:20 P. M., he issued an order to his corps 
commanders to establish their commands on the lines assigned 
them, and put them in a condition of defense without a moment's 
delay. 

During the afternoon and night Meade's corps was placed 
along the Mineral Spring road north of Chandler's house, and 
stretching to a bend in the river just above Scott's dam. This 
was a strong defensive position, the left of the line resting on 



28 

the river, and a small creek running parallel with its front the 
entire distance. It was impossible to turn it, as General Lee 
readily discovered, and its approaches were such as to make it 
difficult to attack in front. From Chandler's house. Couch's 
corps occupied a line nearly at right angles to Meade's, and ran 
southerly across the turnpike a full quarter of a mile east of the 
Chancellor house bending westwardly to the Plank road, Slo- 
cum's corps connected with Couch's, and swung to the south and 
west in a half circle, the lines of the two corps having the shape 
of a huge bowl or kettle, with Meade's corps as the handle. The 
rim of this bowl touched the turnpike again about a mile west 
of the Chancellor house, and included all the open ground in its 
front, together with Fairview to the west. Fairview com- 
manded Chancellor's and the open ground in its front, as well 
as the pike both east and west, and when Jackson made his at- 
tack on the afternoon of the 2d, as well as the following morn- 
ing, it proved of great advantage to the Federal artillery. Bir- 
ney's division of Sickles' corps formed a connecting link between 
Slocum's and Howard's corps. Beginning at a point on Slo- 
cum's line which formed the most southerly part of the bowl, 
it ran with a wider curve northwardly to the neighborhood of 
Dowdall's tavern on the pike, a full mile from Slocum's right, 
and skirting the edge of Hazel Grove, which was destined to 
play a most important part in the coming battle. The balance of 
Sickles' corps was massed in the neighborhood of the Chandler 
house. Howard's corps extended westwardly from Dowdall's 
tavern along the turnpike by the Wilderness Church and by Tal- 
ley's, a little upwards of a mile, the extreme right being refused 
at right angles to the pike, and its extremity covered by two field 
pieces placed in small redoubts looking west. Almost the entire 
. front of the line was protected by earthworks, and covered by a 
thick growth of small scrubby oak and pine interspersed with 
vines. 

In view of the surprise which the Federals sufifered on the 
2d, it must be said in justice to General Hooker, that on the 
afternoon of the ist, he directed that the right of Slocum's line 
should fall back and rest at a saw mill on Hunting: Run. Hunt- 



29 

ing Run was a stream heading near Dowdall's tavern and run- 
ning due north, but it was alleged that the saw mill was not 
locatable. Slocum and Howard are both said to have protested 
vigorously against a further refusal of the right wing, holding 
that the forest was impenetrable to troops, except by the roads, 
and it was consequently decided not to change their positions, 
but to strengthen them with breastworks and abatis. 

Had General Lee chosen tp remain behind his works and 
await an attack, it is difficult to speculate as to what would have 
been the outcome. But Lee believed that this was one of the 
occasions, "when the best defense is to attack." The question 
was where and how. His first inclination was to assault Hook- 
er's left, which as we have seen swung off to the river, and 
covered the L^nited States ford. To have commanded that ford 
would have meant Hooker's destruction, and General Jackson 
had that in mind when he was making his attack upon the other 
flank. But an examination of the ground by Lee's engineers 
pronounced an attack upon Meade's front impracticable, and the 
alternative was an attack at some other point. 

It must have been an anxious hour when Lee and Jackson 
consulted over the situation. The story is now familiar of Fitz 
Lee's announcement that Hooker's right was unprotected by 
cavalry, and that the extremity of Howard's line "hung in the 
air." It came as an illumination. Maps were sought for, and 
the subject of roads eagerly investigated. Happily it was dis- 
covered that from Welford's Furnace, where Wright had been 
engaged during the afternoon, a narrow woods road recently 
opened led through the forest by a circuitous route to the Brock 
road, which in turn communicated with the plank and turnpike 
roads at a point beyond and west of Howard's right. It was 
midnight when the plans of Lee and Jackson were concluded, 
and it was determined the latter should lead the flanking column, 
while Lee would hold the front. When Lee asked Jackson what 
force he would require, the latter is said to have replied, he must 
have all of his three divisions, and when Lee said, "What will 
that leave to me," Jackson replied by pointing to McLaws and 
Anderson, to which Lee generouslv assented. The three divi- 



30 

sioiis of Jackson's present were Hill's, Rodes' and Colston's, 
Early having been left at Fredericksburg. Hill's division con- 
sisted of six brigades, Rodes' of five, and Colston's of four. The 
two divisions remaining with Lee, excepting Wilcox's brigade 
which had been returned to Bank's ford, and Barksdale's brigade 
which was left at Fredericksburg with Early, numbered a little 
less than 13,000 infantry. Jackson took with him 88 pieces of 
artillery of the 2d corps, and 14 of the ist corps. General Lee 
retained with his force 24 pieces, which were probably all that 
could be brought into play, the remaining artillery being held in 
reserve. 

As a preliminary move General Lee withdrew his right, and 
Wofford's brigade was shifted to the left. Wright's brigade was 
v/ithdrawn from the Furnace, and it, and Posey's put in position 
across the Plank road. These operations consumed most of the 
night. The work of felling timber and constructing breastworks 
was actively prosecuted on both sides. The pickets of the op- 
posing armies were within speaking distance of each other, and 
throughout the night the forest resounded with the noise of chop- 
ping axes and falling trees. This work upon Hooker's part 
must have been a secret satisfaction to Lee, as it gave assurance 
that Hooker would remain behind his works while Jackson was 
on his way. 

The march was to have begun at 4 o'clock A. M., but it was 
half past five when Colquitt's brigade of Rodes' division moving 
up the Plank road from Aldrich's debouched on the Furnace 
road in rear of the Confederate line and took the lead. The 2d 
Virginia Cavalry preceded the infantry, while the ist, 5th, and 
part of the 3d Virginia were disposed on the right flank and 
rear of the column. The horse artillery accompanying the cav- 
alry amounted to ten pieces. Colston's division followed Rodes' 
and was succeeded by Hill's, each with its artillery contingent, 
ordinance trains, and ambulances. The main trains were di- 
rected to move by roads further to the south towards Todd's 
tavern. As soon as Jackson's move was under way, a strong 
line of skirmishers was sent out from McLaJw's front, and an 
artillery fusilade was opened which had the efifect of causing an 



ol 

immediate response, and assuring Lee of Hooker's continued 
presence. 

The intense energy of General Jackson's nature was never 
more in evidence than on this march. He knew well the hazard- 
ous character of the undertaking, and he felt the responsibility 
which the confidence of his chief had reposed in him. Usually 
at the head of the column, he passed it occasionally in review to 
see that the men were up and to urge it forward. Celerity and 
secrecy were the orders of the day. But he understood too well 
the limits of endurance to overtax his men, and as the day 
grew warm and the air close in the dense thickets through which 
the winding road ran, a halt of ten minutes was ordered every 
hour. Soon after the march began a serious situation developed 
near the Furnace, where the road turned south passing over an 
open space where the column could be seen from Hazel Grove. 
This drew fire from a couple of guns soon to be followed by 
others. The infantry were promptly shunted off to the left to 
go through the woods, and the guns hurried past without a 
thought of returning the fire. General Jackson was not to be 
diverted for a moment from the great object he had in view, and 
directing a regiment of Colquitt's brigade to be detached and 
guard the flank of the column, he ordered it to press forward. 
As the morning progressed the situation at the Furnace became 
more serious. Berdan's sharpshooters were ordered forward, 
followed by Hayman's brigade, and the Georgia regiment became 
seriously involved, and Anderson was compelled to send Posey's 
brigade to its support. Graham's Federal brigade was ordered 
up by Birney in support of Hayman, and Sickles ordered Whip- 
ple's division to be in supporting distance, while Wright's bri- 
gade was started to the support of Posey. So grave did the situ- 
ation appear for a time that Archer's and Thomas' brigades were 
turned back for the protection of the trains. A sharp encounter 
took place between the 23d Georgia and Berdan's sharpshooters, 
in which about forty of the former were captured. While retir- 
ing the 23d Georgia was followed up by Hayman's and Graham's 
brigades, but these fell under a heavy fire from Posey's brigade 
and Brooke's battery, which effectually checked their advance 
until the last of the trains had gone by. 



32 

It is astonishing to learn from the official reports, that the 
movement was perceived from its beginning; and known to Bir- 
ney and to the three corps commanders on that front, as well 
as to General Hooker. As early as nine o'clock Birney informed 
Hooker by couriers that a column of the enemy with guns and 
trains and ambulances was moving across his front to the right. 
In consequence at 9:30 Hooker directed Howard to examine 
the ground upon his flank in case an attack should be made from 
that quarter, "and be prepared for him in whatever direction 
he advances." Howard was also directed to advance his pickets 
for the purpose of observation as far as was safe to obtain time- 
ly information of any approach ; at the same time he sent word 
through Butterfield to Sedgwick to attack in his front if there 
was any reasonable expectation of success, leaving it to his dis- 
cretion. About II A. M. Sickles received several reports from 
Birney that a column of the enemy was moving across his front, 
and with Hooker's approval he joined Birney at Hazel Grove. 
Sickles seems to have been impressed by the movement, and 
reporting it to Hooker, proposed to launch his whole corps 
against the column, inviting Howard and Slocum to join in the 
attack if Hooker approved. Hooker's reply was to advance cau- 
tiously with two divisions, Birney's and Whipple's, and harrass 
the movement as much as possible. More remarkable still, at 
10:50 A. M., Howard sent the following dispatch to Hooker 
from General Deven's headquarters at Talley's, "V/e can observe 
a column of infantry moving westward on a road parallel with 
this on the ridge about a mile and a half to two miles south of 
this. I am taking measures to resist an attack from the west." 
What these "measures" amounted to, does not appear, except 
that signal stations were established at Dowdall's tavern and 
on the extreme right, and some of the reserve artillery placed 
so as to face west. Later in the day Sickles again sent word to 
Hooker that he could break the enemy's column, but bearing in 
mind Hooker's warning to move cautiously he wished support 
from Slocum and Howard of what he proposed to do. Howard 
replied he had no troops to spare, and Slocum referred the 
matter to Hooker. About 4 P. M. Pleasanton's cavalrv was 



33 

ordered from Chancellorsville to co-operate with Sickles who 
had previously moved forward, and Howard was directed to 
send a brigade to Sickles' support. 

While Jackson's movement was thus generally known to the 
other side, they were fully persuaded it meant a retreat, and 
the turning- to the south at the Furnace gave the impression 
that the move was in the direction of Gordonsville. It is claimed 
that several recognizances were made by Devens in his front, 
and that these discovered a body of hostile skirmishers at the 
distance of a couple of miles, but their reports made no differ- 
ence and were regarded as idle stories. In Hamlin's history of 
the battle of Chancellorsville, it is stated that the officer of the 
day reported to Devens and to Howard, that a large force of 
the enemy was passing to his rear, when he was rebuked for 
his statement and warned not to bring on a panic ; that return- 
ing to the picket line and renewing his report, he was called a 
coward and ordered to his regiment. Major Rice of the 153d 
Pennsylvania in command of the picket line at 2:45, sent a dis- 
patch to Von Gilsa, commanding a brigade on the extreme right, 
saying "a large body of the enemy is massing in my front. For 
God's sake make disposition to receive him." When this was 
taken to Howard, he treated it with scorn, and replied no force 
could penetrate the outlying thickets. So confident was Hooker 
that the enemy were now "ingloriously flying," that at 2:30 
P. M.. he sent out a circular to his corps commanders directing 
them to replenish supplies of forage, provisions and ammuni- 
tion, so as to be ready to start in pursuit early in the morning, 
and at 4:10 he telegraphed Sedgwick through Butterfield to 
capture Fredericksburg and everything in it and vigorously pur- 
sue the enemy. "We know he is fleeing, trying to save his 
trains. Two of Sickles' divisions are among them." His 
amazement and dismay can scarcely be conceived, when at 6:30 
an aide stepping into the road from the porch of the Chancellor 
house where they were sitting, and looking westward toward the 
sound of cannonading, called attention to the fugitives crowding 
the turnpike, and learned from them the story, that the whole 
Rebel army had broken loose upon the flank and rear of the 
Federal line. 



^4 

A letter written by General Lee to Mr. Davis during this 
time says that he was then swinging around to his left to come 
up in the enemy's rear and that he had no expectation that Long- 
street would be in time to aid in the contest at that point. Gen- 
eral Lee during the day was making demonstrations on his 
front, which were especially vigorous about three o'clock. 

When the 2(1 Virginia cavalry leading the column emerged 
from the Brock road upon the Plank road, it turned to the right 
and moved along it about three-quarters of a mile to where it is 
intersected by the Germanna ford road. One squadron proceed- 
ing a little farther met with a cavalry picket, which it dislodged 
and pursued for a short distance. The officer returning re- 
ported that he had gotten a view of the right of the Federal line. 
Upon General Jackson's coming up, he and Fitz Lee proceeded 
to the high ground on Burton's farm to reconnoitre. A short 
distance to the north stretched along the turnpike could be seen 
the line of Federal intrenchments with abatis in front, arms 
stacked, and groups of soldiers scattered about in apparent 
abandon. Jackson's expectation had been to reach the enemy's 
rear by the Plank road, but he now saw that this would bring 
him obliquely across their front, and it was evident that to reach 
their rear he would have to extend his turning movement to the 
turnpike. He accordingly directed Rodes to resume his march 
to the pike and there wait orders. Fitz Lee was directed to 
engage the attention of a body of Federal cavalry in the neigh- 
borhood of the plank road, and the Stonewall brigade under 
Paxton with two batteries of Alexander's battalion was sent to 
Hickman's on the plank road to support him if necessary. When 
Jackson joined Rodes on the pike, the head of the column was 
turned to the right, and moved along the turnpike a short dis- 
tance to the neighborhood of Luckett's. where preparations were 
made for attack. The formation was in three lines, perpendicu- 
lar to the turnpike, extending about a mile on either side. Jack- 
son must have anticipated finding the enemy some distance away 
from the pike, otherwise he would not have extended his flanks 
so far. Owing to the density of the woods and the extent of 
his front, the deployment consumed much time. The hour and 



35 

a half lost at the start would now have been invaluable. Four 
brigades of Rodes' division, Colquitt's, Doles', O'Neill's and 
Iverson's running from right to left in the order named, con- 
stituted the first line, which was covered with sharpshooters de- 
ployed as skirmishers about 400 yards to the front. Colston's 
division except Paxton's brigade which had been detached, 
formed the second line, Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division 
took the place of Paxton and formed in support of Colquitt, over- 
lapping it by a regiment. On the left of the first and second 
lines, a regiment of Iverson's brigade was formed as flankers, 
with skirmishers on its left. Hill's division formed the third 
line. Three of his brigades were deployed, and the others fol- 
lowed in column of route. The 2d Virginia cavalry was on the 
left of the infantry, and wa? directed when the advance com- 
menced to take and hold the road leading to Ely's ford. The 
artillery took the lead, but were shortly relieved by the artillery 
of Rodes' division. The force present with Jackson of all arms 
was estimated at 26,500 officers and men. Particular directions 
had been given for preserving quiet throughout the march, and 
every brigade was now directed how to act and move, always 
keeping the road as a guide. Jackson's purpose was, when he 
approached within reach of Chancellorsville to direct a part of 
his force upon Chandler's so as to take Chancellorsville and 
Fairview in rear, and cut ofif Hooker from the fords on the 
river, and doubtless that was the reason for his sweeping so far 
to the north. 

It must have been near six o'clock, when the alignment be- 
ing completed. Jackson inquired of Rodes if he was ready. 
Rodes replied he was, and giving the order to Major Blackford 
in command of the skirmishers, the latter moved forward and 
in a few minutes struck the Federal pickets. The latter like 
startled hares, broke for their reserves, who with a feeling of 
perfect security were about to get their evening meal. The sur- 
prise was complete. A bolt from the sky would not have startled 
Von Gilsa's men half so much as the musket shots in the thicket, 
and the sight of their flying comrades, followed by a straggling 
line of skirmishers, and then by a solid wall of gray, forcing 



36 

their way through the timber and bearing down upon them 
like an irresistible avalanche. There was no stemming such a 
tide. The two guns fired a round or two, and efforts were 
made by the infantry here and there to form, and make some 
show for a fight. But the shock was too great ; the sense of 
utter helplessness was too apparent. The resistance oft'ered was 
speedily beaten down. There was nothing left but to lay down 
their arms and surrender, or flee. They threw them away, and 
fled. Arms, knapsacks, clothing, equipage, everything, was 
thrown aside and left behind. The camp was in wild confusion. 
Men lost their heads in terror, the road and the woods on both 
sides were filled with men, horses and cattle, in one mad flight. 
The rebel yells added terror to the situation, and the two guns 
moving abreast of the line of battle and firing alternately into 
the fleeing mass, completed the panic. Rodes' line swept for- 
ward driving the mass before it, but no line with so wide a 
front could advance rapidly through such a forest. The high 
ground at Talley's, five-eighths of a mile distant, which over- 
looked the neighborhood was the first vantage point which 
Jackson aimed at. This place was protected by redoubts and a 
battery of guns. But the panic which began with Von Gilsa's 
brigade had spread through the division, and the resistance of- 
fered at Talley's. was scarcely more than was encountered at 
the first onset. The battery was captured without its having 
fired a shot, and the infantry were swept along with the fleeing 
mass. 

Beyond Talley's is a stretch of forest extending to the open 
space around Dowdall's tavern. The tavern is located on high 
ground just beyond the intersection of the plank road with the 
turnpike, and is surrounded by undulating fields which slope to 
the south and west to the margin of a small stream. These 
fields were occupied by Bushbeck's brigade, about 1,500 strong, 
of Steinwehr's division. The open space on the north side of 
the road had been occupied by Barlow's brigade of the same 
division, but had during the forenoon been ordered to the sup- 
port of Sickles beyond Hazel Grove. A battery was posted on 
the high ground at the tavern, where Bushbeck's infantry occu- 



c7 

pied rifle pits looking south. Another line of rifle pits had been 
constructed at right angles to the latter running across the pike 
between the church and the woods to the east, and on these 
rifle pits facing west Bushbeck rallied his men to meet the com- 
ing storm. A number of guns constituting the reserve artillery 
were also in position on this line. Schurz's division was en- 
camped on some ground north and northwest of Dowdall's called 
Hawkins' farm. Two regiments were thrown out still further 
to the west of the road leading to Ely's ford. The remainder of 
the division was located west of the church, and a battery of 
guns bore directly upon the intersection of the two roads. From 
where Rodes first struck Von Gilsa's brigade to Dowdall's is a 
mile and a quarter. On reaching the opening which revealed the 
latter position, Rodes paused a moment for his men to take 
breath and to straighten his lines. During the pause Colston's 
men in the second line pressed to the front and when the com- 
mand was given, both lines dashed forward together, and with 
redoubled force threw themselves upon Schurz and Bushbeck. 
Although the resistance was stout the contest was too unequal 
to last long, and the victorious Confederates soon swept away 
everything in their path. Weidrich commanding the battery on 
the hill, says he was unable to use his guns with effect because 
his front was filled with their own men. Dilger's guns at the 
intersection of the roads was said by Schurz to have done good 
service. Bushbeck offered a determined resistance, his loss be- 
ing 255 in killed and wounded, including three regimental com- 
manders killed. When Schurz learned of the situation he made 
an effort to throw some of his regiments into line at right angles 
with the pike west of the Church. Failing to make good his 
position, he fell back on Bushbeck and attempted a rally of his 
men there. It soon became evident that the Federals were not 
only outnumbered but outflanked, and Schurz drew off such of 
his men as he could gather up by the Bullock road in the di- 
rection of Chandler's house. Bushbeck withdrew to the heights 
at Fairview. The accounts of the battle thus far by those en- 
gaged are naturally conflicting. Colonel Von Gilsa command- 
ing the 1st Federal brigade, reports that when his skirmishers 



38 

were driven in, his whole line was at once engaged furiously, 
but his brigade stood coolly and bravely, firing three times, until 
he was outflanked, when he fell back, expecting to rally behind 
the second line formed by the third division, but that he could 
not find the second line as it was abandoned before he reached 
it. General McLean, commanding the 2d brigade, says the two 
pieces of artillery with Von Gilsa's brigade fired but a few 
times, and then broke down the road in rear of the rifle pits : 
that the 75th Ohio was wheeled into column to the right and 
deployed, but the attack was so impetuous, the regiments in his 
front at once broke in great confusion, interfering with its de- 
ployment, but still it was able to form and deliver its fire until 
ordered to face about. General Devens commanding the div- 
sion says that while it has been suggested that the ist division 
was to some extent surprised, he felt it his duty to say, in riding 
down the entire line he found no officers or men out of their 
assigned positions, and all prepared to meet the attack: that the 
skirmishers along both brigade fronts behaved with great reso- 
lution, keeping the enemy back as long as could be expected, 
and that notwithstanding the confusion in which the division 
was forced to relinquish its first position, he thought a second 
line might have been formed within the lines of General Schurz 
had his division been able to maintain its position. Schurz in 
his report speaks of the difficulties of the position in changing 
fronts, and says he was hemmed in by a variety of obstacles in 
front and dense pine brush in rear, and the "command had 
hardly been given when almost the whole of McLean's brigade 
mixed up with a number of Von Gilsa's men came rushing down 
the road from General Deven's headquarters in wild confusion, 
and the battery of the ist division broke in on his right at a 
full run : that the whole line deployed on the old turnpike facing 
south was rolled up and swept away in a moment." The panic 
which began with Deven's division and spread through How- 
ard's corps carried demoralization into adjoining commands, and 
swept some of these into the general stampede. A small force of 
Confederate infantry running up against the Federal force in 
the neighborhood of Hazel Grove were repulshed by the guns 



CO 

stationed there, but not before they had carried off a mule train 
of ammunition, and thrown into disorder Berry's park of artil- 
lery which with fugitives from the nth corps, rushed through 
Williams' division carrying part of that organization with it and 
adding to the general confusion. The chief of artillery of 
Berry's division describing it says, "As we passed General 
Hooker's headquarters a scene burst upon us which God grant 
may never be seen again in the Federal army of the United 
States. The nth corps had been routed and were fleeing to 
the river like scared sheep. The men and artillery filled the 
roads, its sides and the skirts of the field; and it appeared that 
no two or one company could be found together. Aghast and 
terror stricken, heads bare, and panting for breath, they pleaded 
like infants at the mother's breast that we should let them pass 
to the rear unhindered." Berry who was near the Chandler 
house with two of his brigades when the fugitives from How- 
ard's corps began surging in, was ordered by Hooker to cover 
the rear of the nth corps, and he proceeded at double quick 
with Hayes' brigade of the 2d corps to endeavor to stem the 
tide and cover the retreat. 

General Rodes in his report says the movement was slightly 
delayed because the order to advance was not promptly extended 
to the skirmishers, but when put in motion, the line rushed for- 
ward sweeping everything before it, and pressing on to Talley's 
carried the works there, capturing five guns : that so complete 
was the success, and such the surprise of the enemy that scarcely 
any organized resistance was met with after the first volley was 
fired : that the enemy fled in tlie wildest confusion, leaving the 
field strewn with arms, accoutrements, clothing, caissons and 
field pieces in every direction. 

When the works at Dowdall's had been taken, General 
Jackson directed the pursuit to be pressed. Beyond on all sides 
was the forest again, the ground descending gradually for some 
distance to a feeble stream, and then ascending to the heights of 
Fairview, with gulleys and ravines interspersed. At a point be- 
tween Dowdall's and the stream on the Plank road, Slocum's 
right had rested before Williams' division had been called to 



40 

the assistance of Sickles, and Williams had constructed substan- 
tial works of logs and earth across the road at this point facing 
westerly. Had these works been manned by Williams' troops, 
when Rodes reached them they would have formed the most 
formidable obstacle the Confederates had yet met with, but 
fortunately for them they were unoccupied. 

Rodes had not pushed his way much, if any, beyond this 
point, when the increasing confusion of his long line now mixed 
up with that of Colston, and the approach of night caused him 
to order a halt and request Jackson to send forward Hill to take 
his place. This was immediately done, and Jackson with in- 
creasing eagerness urged the pursuit. Rodes had reported that 
he discovered nothing in the road in his front between him and 
I'airview, and everything promised complete success. Lp to that 
time, the forces at Fairview had consisted of but two brigades. 
But Williams' division had now been recalled and was seeking 
to occupy its old lines. Williams says on reaching the vicinity 
of Fairview he found it swarming with fugitives of the nth 
corps, and moving Ruger's and Knipe's brigades by the flank, 
at a double quick along the line south of the Plank road, he 
faced them to the front and pushed forward into the woods, di- 
recting Knipe to reoccupy his original works. It was these 
troops which now presented an unexpected obstacle to Rodes' 
and Hill's continued advance. As they came to the front Lane's 
and Pender's brigades deployed on either side of the road. Lane 
on the right and Pender on the left. McGowan subsequently 
formed on Lane's right and Archer on Lane. While this was 
going on Colonel Crutchfield, Jackson's chief of artillery had 
two or three guns run forward on the road half a mile beyond 
Dowdall's and open fire on Fairview. This drew from the guns 
in position there a return fire which raked the Plank road and 
shelled the woods on either side. Hill's brigades not in the act 
of deploying were now moving along the road en route, the in- 
fantry on the left, the artillery on the right. The effect of this 
fire was for a few moments -demoralizing to the artillery horses 
and drivers, and the infantry were compelled to dodge into the 
woods. Lane complained to Hill that the effect of the Confed- 



41 

erate fire was interrupting- the movement of his own troops, 
whereupon Hill had it stopped and that from the Federal guns 
died out also. By this time it was full dark. General Jackson 
however was determined to press on, and not for a moment 
did he think of allowing a halt with victory seemingly in his 
grasp. "Press on," was his command to Lane, and while the 
latter had his skirmishers out and his lines ready to advance, 
Jackson impatient of delay, rode forward in advance to satisfy 
himself of the exact situation. It was when returning to his 
lines with a small escort composed of some of his stafif and a 
few couriers, that they were mistaken for the enemy and re- 
ceived a volley of musketry from their friends. The volley 
killed several of the group and wounded others, among them 
General Jackson, as it proved fatally. With much difficulty he 
was borne on a litter to the rear. General Hill who was nearby 
assumed command. Fearing the effect upon the troops, he di- 
rected that the news of the disaster should not be made known, 
but as the sad litter was borne along the road, the news quickly 
spread of the loss which had befallen the army. The nemesis 
of fate which now threw its shadow over the fortunes of the 
Confederacy was not content with one victim. Hill had scarcely 
taken command when a similar accident befell him. Bursts of 
musketry with occasional cannonading were now springing up in 
every direction. No one could tell friend from foe. The i8th 
North Carolina was beginning its advance on the north side of 
the road directed toward a battery in its front, when General 
Hill and staff to avoid the fire which at the moment was sweep- 
ing down the road, dashed into the woods in front of the regi- 
ment, and the latter mistaking them for Federal cavalry fired 
several rounds before the mistake was discovered. General Hill 
was disabled, and the command then devolved by right on Rodes. 
Rodes says that he received a message from Hill to that effect. 
A staff officer of Hill's rode in haste to Stuart who had joined 
Fitz Lee at Ely's ford, bearing an urgent message for him to 
come and take command, and Stuart says that Hill formally 
turned over the command to him. It was an awkward situation, 
and might have proved embarrassing, but Rodes was a true 



42 

patriot as well as a good soldier, and he gracefully acquiesced. 
General Stuart was a great favorite with the army, and it was 
thought he could best restore the confidence suffered from Jack- 
son's loss. Any further attack for the night was abandoned. 

While General Jackson's movement and attack had been a 
great success in the way of surprise, and the rout of the nth 
corps with the capture of a number of guns and prisoners had 
been complete, the result was on the whole disappointing. The 
heights at Fairview still frowned upon the Confederates and 
time was now given to reinforce and strengthen these. Another 
hour of daylight would undoubtedly have swept Jackson into 
Chancellorsville with as little resistance as he had encountered 
up to the time when night overtook him. When Lane drew back 
his right wing, Ruger reoccupied his old position, but Knipe in 
making an effort to do the same thing came in contact with 
Lane's left, and in the darkness this led to much confusion and 
several collisions. The 128th Pennsylvania regiment which blun- 
dered into his lines was made captive along with its Colonel. 
Williams finding he could not reoccupy his old works on the 
Plank road, now took up a new line through the woods in front 
of the ravine near Fairview connecting with the left of Berry's 
division of the 3d corps, and the night was passed in throwing 
up defences of logs and earth along the whole of the new line. 

It was a bad night for both sides. Commands were grop- 
ing in the dark to find the positions assigned them, and strug- 
gling groups were wandering around in search of their com- 
mands. Alarms were frequent. Intermittent flashes of mus- 
ketry burst out and threw a glare over the forest, and the guns 
from Fairview opened at intervals. The unpleasantness of the 
situation was intensified by a midnight attack from the direction 
of Hazel Grove by Sickles with two brigades, designed to drive 
Lane from his position and occupy the Plank road. In making 
his attack Sickles formed Ward's and Hayman's brigades in 
echelon, one behind the other, each company marching in column 
of fours, at deploying intervals, with fixed bayonets, and under 
orders not to fire until the Plank road was reached. When the 
column was put in motion it penetrated the interval between the 



43 

respective lines, and the right struck the centre of Williams' 
division while the left ran into the right of Lane's brigade. Re- 
ceiving a cross fire from friend and foe, despite orders to the 
contrary, the advancing column opened fire, and dashed through 
the darkness at whatever might be in its front. Lane's left was 
not heavily engaged, but on his right he had difficulty in beating 
off two successive attacks. Slocum says that not being in- 
formed of Sickles' proposed attack, on hearing the firing he 
supposed the enemy was advancing on Williams' division, and 
he at once opened fire on them with his artillery, and Williams 
fired upon all lines that made their appearance in his front. The 
attack accomplished no results. Bigelow quotes from a private 
letter of General Williams written at the time this account of 
the night. ''A tremendous roll of musketry fire, mingled with 
yellings and shoutings almost diabolical and infernal opened the 
conflict on the side of Sickles' division. For some time my 
infantry and artillery kept silent ^and in the intervals of mus- 
ketry, I could distinctly hear the oaths and imprecations of the 
rebel officers, evidently having hard work to keep their men 
from stampeding. In the meantime Sickles' artillery opened 
fire over the heads of the infantry, and the din of arms and 
inhuman yellings and curses redoubled. All at once Berry's di- 
vision crossing the road on our right opened in heavy volleys, 
and Knipe commanding my right brigade next to the road on 
the south followed suit. Best began to thunder with his thirty 
odd pieces. In front and on the flank shell and shot and bullets 
were poured into the woods, which were evidently crowded wnth 
rebel masses preparing for the morning attack. Human lan- 
guage can give no idea of such a scene, — such an infernal and 
yet sublime combination of sound and flame and smoke and 
dreadful yells of rage, of triumph or of defiance." 

At 6 A. M., A-Tay 3d, Jackson's three divisions, now under 
command of Stuart, renewed the attack. The night had been 
spent by the Federals in strengthening the first line of works, 
which in front of Fairview stretched squarely across the road, 
and in erecting barricades behind these. The Federal centre was 
held bv Williams' and Berrv's divisions. Pender and Thomas 



44 

north of the road stormed and carried two Hnes of works and 
assailed a third where a long and desperate struggle ensued. 
Being subjected to a severe artillery fire, they gave ground and 
fell back upon the captured works where they waited for rein- 
forcements. One of Pender's regiments advancing beyond the 
brigade captured Brigadier General Hays and staff of the Union 
army. Lane and McGowan with a part of Heth's brigade under 
Brockenbrough, on the south of the road likewise charged the 
works in their front in the face of the fire from the 38 guns at 
Fairview, and after a determined fight were able to seize and 
hold the works for some time, until McGowan's right flank be- 
coming exposed, they were compelled to retire. Archer on the 
extreme right in charging forward inclined to the right, which 
left a gap between McGowan and himself. Pressing on he 
struck the rear of Birney's division leaving Hazel Grove, and 
attacked Graham's brigade inflicting severe loss, capturing a 
number of prisoners and a battery and opening the way to Hazel 
Grove. Hazel Grove proved to be the key to the situation. It 
jutted out beyond the contour of the Federal line, and Sickles 
wanted to hold it: but Hooker on looking over the field at day- 
light decided it was untenable, and directed Sickles to move to 
Fairview and occupy a new line of intrenchments extending 
across the Plank road in rear of Fairview, the front line occupy- 
ing the artillery breastworks. A similar experience fell to Sickles 
at Gettysburg when he was ordered by Meade to withdraw from 
the peach orchard because his right flank was too far in ad- 
vance. 

In the meantime Perry's brigade of Anderson's division 
which had remained with Lee^ was put in motion before daylight 
to gain ground to its left, and if possible get in touch with 
Stuart. Posey's brigade which had spent the night in the neigh- 
borhood of the Furnace was directed to do likewise, and finding 
nothing in its way it proceeded in the direction of Hazel Grove. 
Mahone and Wright also endeavored to gain ground to the left 
and conform to these movements, but the character of the coun- 
try made any alignment impossible, and none of the four brigades 
were in touch with each other. 



45 

As Lane abd McGowan advanced, they lost touch and 
moved without support on either flank, McGowan struck Hay- 
man's brigade while the latter was changing position and threw 
it into greater disorder, after which it encountered Mott's and 
Ruger's brigades, and after a fierce fight was itself thrown back 
upon its starting point. 

Lane supported by Brockenbrough, with Pender on his left 
attacked the centre of the Federal line at the Plank road, where 
the 3d Maryland was overwhelmed and a number of prisoners 
and a section of artillery captured while firing charges of can- 
ister. The 115th Pennsylvania was ordered to take the place of 
the Maryland regiment, but refused to budge from its tracks. 
The 5th and 8th New Jersey came to tlie rescue and a desperate 
fight ensued with great loss to both sides. There was charge 
and counter-charge. The ground was won and lost, and won 
again. Pender reinforced, attacked the left of Berry's division 
held by the ist Massachusetts supported by the nth New Jersey, 
and Berry regarding his position critical sent to Hooker for aid. 
Shortly afterward he was killed crossing the road, and Carr 
succeeded to the command. The two regiments were both badly 
shattered and compelled to fall back and reform in rear of the 
artillery at Fairview, while Franklin's brigade was rushed to 
the front in their stead. The remainder of Carr's line gave way 
from left to right as Pender and Thomas in succession fell upon 
its flank. French's division with some accessions from Han- 
cock came to its rescue and formed obliquely to the Plank road. 
Lane's brigade which had suffered severely was compelled to 
retire and reform after the loss of one-third its strength. Mott's 
and Ruger's success, and French's advance made it a stand off 
fight, and Stuart ordered up his second line. Colston put in 
two brigades on either side of the road, but to meet a pressure 
on the right shifted Paxton to the south of the road, just in time 
to meet the Federal attack which was sweeping- everything be- 
fore it. Colston describes it as a critical moment. McGowan's 
and Pender's troops had exhausted their ammunition and were 
hugging their breastworks. One of the fiercest battles of the 
day followed. Paxton was killed, and also Garnett commanding 



4t> 

Jones' brigade. For a time the tide of battle fluctuated. Col- 
ston's three brigades made several distinct charges with varying 
success, but finally held fast to the ground gained. On the north 
side of the road Nichols' Louisiana brigade became hotly en- 
gaged, and support had to be extended from the south side. Its 
ammunition was finally exhausted and it was being forced back, 
when Colcjuitt's brigade rendered timely assistance enabling it to 
hold its ground. 

Up to this time the Confederate artillery had been of little 
use, although several Napoleon guns posted by Jones on the 
Plank road" were used with efifect upon the works at Fairview. 
When Archer opened the way to Hazel Grove, Pegrapi was 
sent with his batteries to occupy that ground and was speedily 
joined by Huger with his batteries. These guns were brought to 
bear upon Geary's lines to the east, and upon Fairview and the 
Federal lines to the north. Carter's and Mcintosh's battalions 
also took positions upon the high ground in the vicinity, and an 
effective and concentrated fire was kept up which contributed 
largely to determine the fortunes of the day. 

The battle still hung fire and Rodes' division was called into 
action. O'Neill's and Iverson's brigades were put in on the 
north side of the road and Ramseur's and Dole's on the south, 
Colquitt had already been called to Nichols' assistance. Two of 
O'Neill's regiments advancing to the attack became separated 
from the brigade and obliquing to the right, met the enemy's 
fire from behind barricades on the south side of the road and 
not more than two hundred yards distant from the works at 
Fairview. Pender thereupon advanced a portion of his and 
Iverson's lines and the barricades were abandoned. Whereupon 
Hall leading the 5th and 26th Alabama regiments and the 23d 
North Carolina carried the heights and planted their colors on 
the works, Colonel Garvin falling on the inside. The colors 
were subsequently captured and again recaptured. The remain- 
der of Rodes' line meeting with a repulse and failing to sustain 
Hall, he was compelled to retreat. A second line of battle was 
then formed and another attack ordered moving parallel with the 
road, and the heights were gained a second time, and a second 
time given up because of a repulse on the left. 



I 



47 

Ramseur and Doles on the south side of the road passed 
over the first and second Confederate Hnes, and immediately be- 
came furiously engaged. Doles deflecting to the right passed 
up a ravine behind the graveyard, and came out upon the field 
nearly opposite the Chancellor house, driving the enemy out 
of his entrenchments and pressing him back upon the batteries 
at Fairview, capturing a number of prisoners and several guns 
v.hich had been abandoned. During the movement Doles came 
in contact with Slocum's left who was changing position. Find- 
ing his flank and rear open to Slocum he withdrew. Ramseur 
after pushing to the front and repulsing several assaults, found 
himself exposed to an enfilade fire, and was forced to go back. 
The 30th North Carolina on his right in the meantime, struck 
Graham's brigade in flank and took several hundred prisoners. 

The Federals still held their position in a ravine on Ram- 
suer's right preventing his further advance, and his line was 
successfully retired by Colonels Grimes and Cox, the latter re- 
maining on the ^eld though wounded in five or six places. 

While the Confederate lines at the Plank road were gen- 
erally perpendicular to it, such was not always the case. Chris- 
tie commanding the 23d North Carolina had his left swung for- 
ward almost parallel with the road, while Hall and the 5th Ala- 
bama on the south side had is right swung violently back. Con- 
fronting these were Berdan's sharpshooters and the I22d Penn- 
sylvania. 

At 9 A. M. the Federal lines had considerably shifted. In 
support of the centre two brigades under Franklin and Meagher 
had been drawn from Hancock. Geary found his line untenable 
after the occupation of Hazel Grove, and he formed a new line 
at right angles with the former, the right resting near the Chan- 
cellor house. In making the change he came in contact with 
Doles, and Graham brought up against Ramseur. On the north 
side Iverson was in contact with French, and Col. I. M. Wil- 
liams commanding Nichols' brigade with his left refused was 
confronted by Tyler's brigade. Sickles about this time retired 
to Chancellorsville, forming in three lines on Hancock's right, 
with his batteries between Fairview and Chancellorsville. 



48 

Both sides had now fought to a frazzle, and were thor- 
oughly exhausted. Both had displayed with a few exceptions 
the most determined courage and obstinacy. No more desperate 
fighting was ever done over such a length of time. The ground 
was covered with the slain, and in some places the woods had 
taken fire, and the ground was hot to stand on. The Federal 
artillery after the Confederates got in position was badly 
smashed. Slocum mentions that two of his battery commanders 
were killed, sixty-three cannoneers killed or wounded, and eighty 
horses shot in harness. 

But ti was now becoming apparent that the Federals were 
playing a losing game. As their lines became contracted they 
were more exposed to the destructive fire of the Confederate 
artillery. Hooker gave orders to retire. Hancock described his 
situation as fighting in opposite directions, one line faced Fred- 
ericksburg, the other towards Gordonsville, the enemy's lines 
being half a mile apart, and projectiles from his artillery from 
front and rear passing over both his lines, while they were en- 
filaded by other pieces in different positions. The battery at 
the right of the Chancellor house had lost all its officers and 
cannoneers and horses, and had to be moved by hand by details 
from the infantry. Covering the retirement of Sickles and 
Slocum, Hancock left the field at lo A. M. and moving half a 
mile to the rear, established a new line occupying the left of a 
salient toward the Chancellor house. Anderson who had been 
steadily pressing forward was now able to join hands with 
Stuart, and when that was efifected a general advance was or- 
dered. Wright's brigade was the first to emerge upon the 
plains of Chancellorsville, and he was quickly followed by the 
remainder of Anderson's and Stuart's troops. McLaws at the 
same time moving up along the Plank road. 

When General Lee rode into the open to greet his victori- 
ous troops he received a tumultuous ovation which must have 
stirred his soul. The troops were wild with excitement and 
success. The past with its horrors was forgotten, and they knew 
only the delirium of victory. The welkin rang with shouts and 
cheers, and the war-worn veterans almost wept for joy. 



49 

The victory was won at a fearful sacrifice. The list of killed 
and wounded in Jackson's three divisions was reported at 6,872: 
that in the 2d, 3d, nth and 12th Federal armp corps including 
the missing-, at 11,168. The battle on either side was fought in 
a disjointed way. When success was achieved at one point, sup- 
port was lacking to make it good, and there was a general want 
of concert. This was due in large measure to the character ol 
the ground, and the difficulty of seeing and knowing how things 
were going. General Stuart was subjected to some criticism foi 
the manner in which the troops were handled, which caused him 
to address General Lee on the subject, but the latter thought it 
did not require investigation. In his official report he says of 
Stuart, "He conducted the operations on the left with distin- 
guished capacity and vigor, stimulating and cheering the troops 
by the example of his own coolness and daring." 

General Hooker's new position was in the shape of an ob- 
tuse angle, each leg of which touched a bank of the river ir. 
rear. Couch and Howe were on the left leg, Meade and Rey- 
nolds on the right, with Sickles at the Salient, and Slocum in 
the rear. 

General Lee immediately made disposition to renew the 
attack and formed his lines along the Plank road, Colston in the 
centre with Anderson and McLaws to his right, and Rodes and 
Heth to his left. Hooker's forces were estimated to be 75.0CX) 
men with 246 pieces of artillery, Lee's at 34,000 with 132 pieces 
of artillery. Notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, Lee's 
confidence in his troops now flushed with victory, was such that 
he determined on another attack. 

When General Hooker appeared before a Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, describing the army of Northern Virginia, 
he paid it this tribute: "That army has by discipline alone ac- 
quired a character for steadiness and efficiency, unsurpassed in 
my judgment in ancient or modern times. We have not been 
able to rival it, nor has there been any near approximation to it 
in the other rebel armies." 

It was at this juncture that General Lee received a message 
from Early that Sedgwick had captured Fredericksburg, and 



60 

was approaching in his rear on the Plank road. He immedi- 
ately directed McLaws to move with the brigades of Kershaw 
and Mahone to meet him. The three remaining brigades of 
McLaws' followed soon after. Meanwhile the attack on Hooker 
was suspended. Hooker received numerous dispatches during 
the day of Sedgwick's movement, and was informed at one P. M. 
that he was on the Plank road at Guest's house, but he preferred 
to sit tight. 

Let us now turn to Sedgwick and Early. Early it will be 
remembered was holding the old line of entrenchments, at Fred- 
ericksburg, from the river above the town to Hamilton's Cross- 
ing, a distance of 6 4-10 miles. Besides his own division, he 
had Barksdale's brigade in the town, and Wilcox's brigade at 
Bank's ford, making altogether about 11,500 men. During the 
forenoon of the 2d, Early was instructed by General Chilton of 
Lee's staff to move to Chancellorsville with all his force, except 
a small body left for observation, and except the reserve artil- 
lery, which was to be sent to the rear to Chesterfield. Early 
and Pendleton who was in charge of the artillery were much 
disconcerted, and suggested that such a move would invite an 
advance from the enemy, but Chilton insisted, and the orders 
v/ere being carried out, when Early received a letter from Gen- 
eral Lee, saying, he feared his wishes had been misunderstood, 
and leaving the matter to Early's discretion. The column was 
faced about and the old positions resumed by 11 P. M., with the 
exception of some artillery which had gotten too far to be re- 
called. During the night of May 2d, Sedgwick received orders 
to cross the river and join Hooker at Chancellorsville at day- 
light on the 3d. Sedgwick however was on the south side, and 
as a strict compliance with the order would have required "him 
to cross twice, he wisely determined to march up the south side 
of the river. By 2 A. M. he had reached the outskirts of the 
town, and found the Confederates in their old position on 
Marye's Hill. Gibbon at Falmouth had been directed to cross 
the river and seize the town. The Massachusetts troops who 
undertook this, were the sam.e who had done so in the previous 
December, and they were opposed by the same Mississippi troops. 



51 

After some resistance the crossing was effected and Barksdale 
retired to the heights west of the town, consisting of WilHs' and 
Marye's Hills and the famous stone wall which had proved such 
a deadly obstacle to Burnside. This stone wall, the remains of 
which still exist, ran at the base of the hill along the east side 
of the Telegraph road, where the same on leaving the town 
turns south. It was about three feet above the road-bed, and 
the ground in front fell away gradually to low land, through . 
v/hich flowed the tail race of a mill emptying into Hazel Run. 
The wall accommodated five or six hundred men, though in the 
previous battle the number was much larger. Behind the wall 
on the hill was a battery of four guns, and howitzers faced the 
Plank road and the pike. Barksdale's two remaining regiments 
and one of Hays' Louisiana were posted in the old entrench- 
ments south of Hazel Run, and in front of Lee's Hill and the 
Howison house, covering a distance of about a mile. The bal- 
ance of Hays' brigade occupied i,ooo yards of entrenchments 
to the north, and when Wilcox arrived, he was still further north 
at Stansbury's hill facing the canal. Connecting with Barksdale 
on the south and stretching to Hamilton's Crossing were the 
brigades of Hoke. Gordon and Smith. Early had on his whole 
line 42 guns, 28 of which were south of Hazel Run, and 14 north 
of that point. Sedgwick had 66 guns on the south side of 
the river and 40 on the north side, including a number of 
twenty pounder Parrotts, and 4 1-2 inch seige guns. Sedgwick 
wishing to avoid a direct attack upon Marye's Heights directed 
Howe with his division to make a turning move to the left, and 
Gibbons was directed to do the same thing on the right. Howe 
advanced, but found he would have to cross the ravine of Hazel 
Run, and expose his flank, which caused him to pause. Gibbon 
moving to the right found he would have to cross the canal to 
effect his object. Wilcox at Bank's ford, had been led to be- 
lieve from indications in his front that the Federal force there 
was withdrawn, and he determined to move to Chancellorsville, 
leaving a guard at the ford. He was scarcely in motion when 
his pickets reported Gibbon's advance, on the road between the 
■canal and the river. Gathering up a handful of skirmishers he 



52 

delayed the advance until Huger could bring up a section of 
artillery, which shelled the column forcing it to seek cover. The 
delay enabled Wilcox to destroy the bridge over the canal which 
Gibbon was aiming to cross. As the canal was both wide and 
deep, Gibbon reported the attempt as impracticable, and left 
Sedgwick no alternative but to attack in front. 

The column of attack which began at 10:30 consisted of ten 
'regiments drawn from Newton's and Burnham's divisions. Four 
of the regiments taking the Plank road, moved in column of 
fours, and two taking the turnpike, a continuation of the tele- 
g-raph road where it entered the town, moved in like formation. 
On the left of these columns where the ground was open four 
regiments marched in line of battle. The artillery on Marye's 
Hill seems to have held their fire longer than was prudent, as 
the guns could not be sufficiently depressed to be efifective at 
short range, but at the distance of three hundred yards the how- 
itzers on the Plank road opened with canister and the column 
was literally swept away. On the other road the column ap- 
proached within less than one hundred yards when it too was 
swept back by cannon and musketry. The columns were rallied 
and reformed, and a second time were broken and compelled to 
seek shelter, along with the lines to the left. During an interval 
which now took place a flag of truce was sent out from the 
Federal line asking permission to remove the dead, which was 
granted by the Colonel of the i8th Mississippi. The 17th Mass- 
achusetts which had retired for cover behind a board fence had 
the opportunity while this was going on to see how exceedingly 
few Confederates there were behind their lines, and when this 
information became known, another attack was ordered. This 
time the first line was to be followed by a second at the distance 
of thirty paces, and that by athird. Conscious of their strength 
and the weakness of their adversary, the Federal lines now 
dashed forward and swept over the works with scarcely a pause. 

It is estimated that 7,500 Federal troops participated in the 
assault, and that they outnumbered the Confederates between 
seven and eight to one. .The i8th and part of the 21st Missis- 
sippi regiments, and a company of the Washington artillery with 



53 

their guns were captured, the loss on the Federal side in killed 
and wounded being estimated at between one and two thousand. 
Barksdale realizing his weakness had sent to Hays and Wilcox 
for assistance, and five regiments were on their way when it was 
found they were too late. General Newton is quoted as saying, 
"If there had been lOO more men on Marye's Hill we could not 
have taken it." 

The capture of Marye's Heights split the Confederate force, 
and left the way open to Sedgwick to pursue Early by the Tele- 
graph road running south near Spottsylvania Court House, or to 
turn west and follow the Plank road. Newton's division was di- 
rected on the Plank road, and Brook's was directed to follow. 
Gibbon returned to Fredericksburg to take possession of the 
town, and Howe followed Early on the Telegraph road. Barks- 
dal eattempted a rally at Lee's Hill, but was corhpelled to give 
way. Early hastened to check the pursuit, and when Hays' regi- 
ments came round from the Plank road, with these and Gor- 
don's brigade, he established a line at Cox's house i 3-4 miles 
further south. Cox's and a little group of dwellings is situate 
where a road coming from the direction of Salem Church inter- 
sects the Telegraph road, and the denizens of the little borough 
retain a lively tradition of what they regard as one of the battles 
of the war. Howe could not have considered the pursuit seri- 
ous as he does not mention it in his report. Wilcox in the 
meantime when he found that assistance was too late for Barks- 
dale, with admirable judgment moved his command to Salem 
Church on the Plank road, and anticipating Sedgwick's advance 
selected a position at the toll house where he determined to 
make a stand. The battle of Salem Church is regarded as one 
of the most brilliant engagements of the war. The old brick 
church with its walls scarred by bullets and shells, and with its 
gallery and double row of windows, stands a little removed from 
the road on the south side, in the midst of a clump of trees, and 
the schoolhouse a few paces beyond. A'IcLaws did not accept 
Wilcox's position at the toll house, but threw his lines across 
the road about sixty yards in rear of the Church, with two bri- 
gades on either side, and an interval between to be filled by 



54 

Wilcox when he retired. When that was done Wilcox posted a 
company in the Church and one in the schoolhouse with direc- 
tions' to fire from the windows, and one of his regiments he 
held in reserve. As the Federals advanced from the toll house 
the ground ascended slightly with open fields on either side until 
they reached within about two hundred and fifty yards of the 
Church, where there was a thick wood on the south side ex- 
tending nearly to the Church. A slight halt was made here and 
then with three cheers the lines dashed forward. The Confed- 
erates held their fire until the line had gotten within about 
eighty yards, when a terrific volley was discharged causing the 
line to waver and give way. Bartlett with the second brigade 
rushed forward with a new line, surrounded the schoolhouse and 
captured the company in it. Pressing on and striking the loth 
Alabama, that was broken and forced back, and victory seemed 
to be in the grasp of the Federals. But Wilcox quickly hurled 
bis 9th Alabama in reserve upon Bartlett, and a hand to hand 
fight ensued. Bartlett was unable to hold his ground, and amid 
yells and confusion was driven back and the schoolhouse recap- 
tured, the captors themselves becoming captives. The pursuit 
was kept up to the toll house, and a number of prisoners taken. 
In Semmes' front the battle was fought with equal obstinacy. A 
number of assults were repulsed, the loth and 51st Georgia 
charging the enemy in support of Wilcox and driving him back 
to his reserves, a mile distant. Two handsome marble monu- 
ments have been erected near the Church by the New Jersey 
troops engaged in the battle to commemorate the valor of their 
comrades who fell on the field, and upon the face of one of 
these is an inscription to the brave Alabamians who opposed 
them. An instance of generosity and appreciation, as rare as 
it is noble. McLaws made no efTort to hold the ground gained. 
Had he succeeded in doing so, with the front which he occu- 
pied at Salem Church, he could at the toll gate have rested his 
right on Hazel Run and his left would have reached the river 
road, with his front covered by a small stream between him 
and Newton. This would have greatly embarrassed Sedgwick 
in making his final escape. When General Lee sent McLaws to 



55 

the Plank road he informed Early of what he had done, direct- 
ing him to communicate with McLaws and to move upon Sedg- 
wick's left flank, expressing the hope they would unite and be 
able to crush him. Early, at the Cox house on the Telegraph 
road was only about three miles distant from McLaws' right, 
with a good road running westerly to McLaws' rear, and it was 
entirely feasible for Early to have carried out this instruction. 
It would seem he must have heard McLaws' and Sedgwick's 
guns which engaged in an artillery duel before the fight began 
in earnest. But General Early was doubtless chagrined over the 
defeat of the morning, and was anxious to recapture Freder- 
icksburg and Marye's Hill. From the Cox house to Freder- 
icksburg was further than to McLaws, and Fredericksburg it- 
self was of no consequence, except as the high ground upon the 
west might be of use in shutting Sedgwick off from Bank's ford, 
and General Early may have had that in his mind, but at any 
rate he obtained permission from General Lee during the night 
to move in that direction and retake Fredericksburg. Early 
.iccordingly having sent word to McLaws of his intention to 
attack Marye's Hill the next morning (May 4th) and that he 
would extend his left so as to connect with him, he threw Hoke's 
and Hays' brigades across Hazel Run leaving a space of nearly 
two miles between them and McLaws' right. Gordon, followed 
by Smith and Barksdale advanced on Marye's Hill which Gor- 
don seized without serious resistance, and a line was formed 
facing west, Smith on the right on Cemetery Hill, Barksdale on 
Marye's and Willis' hills to look after the rear, and Gordon 
along the Plank road, on a line with Hays facing westerly and 
almost at right angles with Smith. This also put Gordon's back 
to Barksdale. 

Early says he then waited to hear from McLaws and hear- 
ing no sound and finding artillery in his front he sent word to 
McLaws to move. McLaws says he agreed to advance pro- 
vided Early would first attack, and "that he did advance his right, 
and finding his force insufficient for a front attack withdrew. ' 

It would be uncharitable at this day to impute to McLaws 
any feeling of pique because of Early's failure to carry but his 



56 

first instructions. But his conduct is inconsistent with the fine 
r-eputation he bore in the army of Northern Virginia as one of 
its most tried and experienced division commanders. While 
this see-sawing was going on McLaws had appUed to General 
Lee for assistance. Lee generously dispatched Anderson's divi- 
sion, leaving himself only Stuart's battered divisions to face at 
least 75,000 men. In looking at the relative strength of the op- 
posing forces, it is amazing that Hooker did not assume the 
offensive, and attempt a counter-stroke. Reynold's corps and 
the larger part of Meade's corps had not been engaged. How- 
ard's corps had had a day to recuperate, and Averill joined him 
that morning with 4,000 cavalry. Had Hooker any conception 
of the thinness of Lee's lines, his failure to attack would have 
been criminal. But then he had not recovered from the injury 
on the day previous, and he is described as having the appear- 
ance of a man in a stupor. It was asserted at the time and 
afterwards that he was under the influence of liquor, but there 
does not appear to be any foundation for this charge, and if 
there had been, there was not wanting among those high in au- 
thority and none too friendly sufficient hostility to have made it 
good. 

Anderson under instructions from Lee was engaged in feel- 
ing Hooker's left when on the morning of the 4th, he was or- 
dered to proceed with his three remaining regiments and report 
to McLaws on the Plank road. He arrived at 11 A. M., and at 
12 M. was in position between McLaws and Early. 

General Lee was not aware up to this time that Reynolds 
had been transferred from Sedgwick to Hooker, and was under 
the impression that Sedgwick had two corps with him. Sedg- 
wick on the other hand believed that Early had been reinforced 
by the arrival of 15,000 fresh troops from Richmond. Sedg- 
wick's lines covered three sides of a rectangle with the open 
side to the north. Newton's line ran south from a point on 
the River road east of Bank's ford to a point south of the toll 
house on the Plank road facing McLaws. Brooks' line ran just 
south of the Plank road from the toll house to a point beyond 
Guest's house facing Anderson, and Howe faced Earlv to the 



I 



OY 

south and east. General Lee had followed Anderson, and his 
plan seems to have been that Early should attack Howe's left 
driving it towards McLaws, while McLaws and Anderson would 
close in and shut off Sedgwick's escape. 

Lee had left Hooker penned up at Chancellorsville with his 
back to the river at the United States ford. He now had Sedg- 
wick penned up with his only outlet at Bank's ford, and what 
had never happened before he was superior in numbers. If 
Sedgwick were pressed he was bound to be crumpled up like the 
shell of an egg. He was fully alive to the weakness of his po- 
sition. He looked forward to the coming of night and every 
hour that passed gave him increased hope. In the meantime 
the Confederates dallied. From 12 M. to 6 P. M., nothing was 
done except some minor changes of position. When the advance 
began no serious resistance was met with except by Gordon and 
Hays, but there as elsewhere night intervened and the pursuit 
was abandoned. It must have been a cruel disappointment to 
General Lee. A report was current at the time in the army that 
upon his arrival on the ground and during the afternoon he was 
much disturbed over the failure of his plans, and that he ex- 
pressed his displeasure in words which bore no uncertain sound. 

Newton and Brooks fell back rapidly on Bank's ford where 
they took position on the heights and in riflle pits, and Howe 
soon followed. At 1 1 150 P. M. Sedgwick, unwilling to cross 
the river without Hooker's permission wrote him, that his army 
was hemmed in, covered by the guns on the north side of Bank's 
ford, and asking if he should jeopard its safety by retaining it 
on the south side. At one A. M., Butterfield replied, to with- 
draw. At 1 :20 Hooker sent an order countermanding the au- 
thority to withdraw. When Butterfield's dispatch was received 
Sedgwick began crossing immediately, and when that from 
Hooker was received, he replied at 2 :30 that nearly all his com- 
mand was over. 

At a council of war held at Hooker's headquarters at mid- 
night of May 4th-5th, all the corps commanders being present 
except Slocum and Sedgwick, the question was presented 
whether the army should withdraw or attack. Meade, Reynolds 



58 

and Howard voted to attack, Sickles and Couch to withdraw. 
General Hooker then announced that he would take upon him- 
self the responsibility of withdrawing. Warren was directed to 
prepare a new and short line of defence, and to secure the army 
against any attempt to interrupt its passage of the river, and 
the 5th corps was designated as rear guard. On the morning of 
the 5th. leaving Early and Barksdale as before at Fredericks- 
burg, General Lee ordered McLaws and Anderson's divisions 
back to Chancellorsville. Unwilling to be baffled of his prey, 
and his fighting blood rising to the occasion, he resolved to at- 
tack Hooker on both flanks. Anderson and McLaws were put 
in position on Hooker's left and Stuart on his right, and prepara- 
t tions were made for a daylight attack on the 6th. As the order 
f,f^>p%t,iov attack was about to ^btfi^itt, Pender galloped up to General 
ee's headquarters then at Fairview, and announced that his 
skirmishers on advancing had just discovered that Hooker was 
gone. Those who were present report that General Lee mani- 
fested much disappointment at the announcement, but as he had 
neither pontoons nor transportation any thought of pursuit was 
out of the question. The crossing of the river was attended with 
much difficulty. At midnight the river rose suddenly over the 
bridges, and one of them had to be taken up to piece out the 
other. The night was dark and it rained in torrents. General 
Hunt in charge of the artillery did not think his guns could all 
be gotten over, and proposed that the movement be suspended 
for a day, but Hooker refused. The rain served to conceal the 
movement from the Confederate pickets, and Hooker's refusal 
to suspend probably saved part of the army from destruction. 
As a final adieu a lively artillery duel sprung up after daylight 
between some of the Federal and Confederate artillery, in which 
each side claimed to have put the other out of commission. 

Thus ended the campaign, with the exception of Stoneman, 
who destroyed some property, and caused a good deal of alarm 
at Richmond, but whose raid was without material effect upon 
General Lee,s communications, and contributed nothing to the 
campaign. To the absence of the greater part of the Federal 
cavalry may be attributed the surprise and destruction of the 



59 

nth corps, and as it turned out, its presence would have been 
more important to Hooker, even than Stuart's to Lee at Gettys- 
burg. The news that Hooker and his army had recrossed the 
Rappahannock was received at the north with increduHty and 
consternation, second only to what occurred after the battle of 
Bull Run. Horace Greely, Editor of the New York Tribune, 
rushed into his office with the latest telegram in his hand, ex- 
claiming "My God! it is horrible! horrible! Think of it. 
130,000 magnificent soldiers cut to pieces by less than 60,000 
half starved ragamuffins." These "ragamuffins" were described 
by a correspondent of the London Times who witnessed the re- 
turn of Anderson's division on the Plank road on May 5th as, 
"splashing through the mud, in wild, tumultuous spirits, singing, 
shouting, jesting, heedless of soaking rags, drenched to the skin, 
and burning again to mingle in the mad revelry of battle." 

DAVID GREGG McINTOSH, 

Col. of Artilley, C. S. A. 
February 23, 191 5. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



1 



002 444 643 8 S( 



